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21 April 1983

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EDITORIAL KEYED TO TRAINING SHORTCOMINGS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 2, Jan 83 (signed to press 3 Jan 83)
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[Editorial: "Party Principle"]

[Text] V.I. Lenin said of those entering the party that they must actually demonstrate the fact that they apply the principles of communism.

No matter what phase of the Communist Party's heroic history we take, it is distinguished by selfless fidelity to the great ideals by its fighters, by their readiness to defend those ideals to the end, by their loyalty to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, to the principles of communism. They carried this unshakable loyalty through the battles at the barricades, through the fierce fighting for Soviet power, through the harsh trials of the Great Patriotic War. Neither the awareness of inevitable losses nor the deprivations or the danger of death--nothing could force the communists to deviate from their chosen path or to betray their own convictions or ideals.

Fighters in the Lenin party have been and still are people of great principle, with firm character and courageous in duty. They firmly and steadfastly put party policy into practice and strive persistently to implement the party's Program and the requirements contained in the CPSU Charter, to see that communist moral standards are observed. The profoundly party-minded position is helping them to orient themselves correctly in the complex international situation, to see the prospects for the nation's development, to devote all their strength to the realization of the party's grand plans and the decisions of its 26th congress. Nor do the communists weaken their effort when it comes to eliminating unsuitable work methods, all that which hampers our advance. The communists pursue a resolute offensive against all manifestations of bourgeois ideology. And behind all this lies a struggle, one demanding extraordinary steadfastness, principle and profound conviction as to the correctness of our great cause. There is nothing more important for the CPSU member than the interests of the party, of the Soviet state and the cause of building communism.

Decisions coming out of the November 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the 7th session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 10th convocation, and documents of the joint, formal meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, conducted in commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR, contain an elaborated program of action for the nation's communists, for all its workers. These decisions and documents are imbued with Leninist concern for the

continued strengthening of the homeland's economic and defense strength, for the flourishing of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and improvement of the people's welfare. They have evoked a new outpouring of creative strength and energy from all the Soviet people and their armed defenders.

Comrade Yu.V. Andropov's statement in his speech at the Plenum that imperialism's aggressive intrigues are forcing us, along with the other fraternal socialist states, to concern ourselves, to concern ourselves seriously, with maintaining the defense capability at the proper level, is of fundamental importance in the life and the combat training of the troops and naval forces. Fightingmen of the army and navy, closing ranks even more tightly round the Communist Party, and unanimously supporting its foreign policy, see their duty as one of devoting all their abilities to the continued enhancement of combat readiness in the army and navy, of improving them in light of the contemporary demands. This desire on the part of all the personnel is brilliantly reflected in the socialist competition launched this training year with the slogan "Increase vigilance, reliably maintain the homeland's security!".

The truly responsible, principled approach to a cause of enormous state importance, that of maintaining the nation's defense capability, is characteristic, first of all, of the army and navy communists. To them being loyal to party principles means guiding themselves by party interests in the service and the training, in all matters, persistently implementing its policy in the Armed Forces, living strictly according to the CPSU Charter and measuring their every step against the extremely important task set for our homeland's armed defenders by the 26th CPSU Congress--to reliably guard the peaceful, creative labor of the Soviet people. The communists' position of principle is demonstrated in their exemplary service, in the fact that they motivate the personnel with their personal example and the strength of their ideological conviction to strive to maintain the units and ships in a constant state of combat readiness, to fulfill their military duty irreproachably. Their position of principle also motivates the people carrying party cards next to their hearts to regard with intolerance every instance of negligence or lack of principles and ideals, any relaxation in the training or poor performance, anything which lowers combat readiness to even the slightest degree.

The party bureau and every communist on the missile-carrying, nuclear-powered submarine commanded by Captain 1st Rank V. Zhuravlev base their work on precisely these principles. Its crew completed the training year with an excellent evaluation. Behind that evaluation lies a determined, uncompromising struggle for effective work on the part of each crew member. The following is just one example. During the first weeks of the cruise the combat crew headed by officer of the watch Captain Lieutenant S. Voylovok occupied last place in the competition. "After all, someone has to be in that spot," even certain of the communists reasoned, assuring pacivity and making life easy for themselves in advance. But what about the principle "Not a single mile without rising a level in combat improvement"? The submarine commander, the political worker and the party bureau secretary decided to take a closer look at the situation. What did they find? Officers S. Voylovok, B. Vakayev and A. Lugovoy, CPSU members, had not created in the crew a climate of rivalry, mutual demandingness and relations based on principle, which preclude the acceptance of simply marking time. A party meeting was held soon thereafter. Briefly stated, the essence of the discussion was this: "Stop moving--fall behind! Is this the attitude of a communist"? The unflattering discussion hit them all where it hurt and motivated the communists and

then, the other sailors, to do their best in the work. Sometime later, for the first time, the combat crew assumed first place in the competition. The other crews were not far behind. And this added to the overall success. All missions on the cruise were given good evaluations.

When the results of the past training year were summed up, along with the accomplishments and conquests, , it was noted that certain military collectives had not achieved the goals outlined for their combat improvement. What facts and developments do we find when we take a look at the situation? We find a deterioration of responsibility, attempts to cover up the real state of affairs, to gloss over shortcomings, to mitigate the blame for specific individuals, and elements of complacency and formalism. It was pointed out at report-and-election meetings that not all of the party organizations are reacting sharply to instances of poor quality in the training exercises, indulgences and simplifications in the combat training. Some party organizations are not making a thorough study of the state of training for the officers, not always exhibiting demandingness with respect to what the CPSU members and candidate members are doing to improve their personal training, and not always assessing in an adequately principled manner the contribution which they are making with respect to maintaining combat readiness and improving the personnel training.

Many of these shortcomings were to be found, for example, in the party organization in which Senior Lieutenant G. Novikov is secretary. The personnel accepted high socialist commitments. Everything indicated that they were realistic. This was not followed with proper organizational work, however. The main party principle, unity of word and deed, was violated. The cause was connivance and lack of demandingness. For example, the party organization did not always bring to account those who failed to fulfill their commitments, particularly commitments in the fire training. It was not an inexorable rule, let us say, to demand an explanation from the communist who had relaxed his attention to this extremely important aspect of the combat training, demand it on the basis of party principle, to ask him why his words and deeds were not one. It is perfectly obvious that the fightingmen's party principle is most fully indicated by his actions, his practical performance, by the extent of his contribution to the collective's common success.

The 9th All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations attached great importance to the well-known position stated at the 26th CPSU Congress with respect to enhancing principle in the work of the party organization. Stress was laid on the fact that it should be manifested in the party collective's ability to assess the state of affairs from common-state, common-party principles, to develop in the communists an active stance in life and a sense of responsibility for the fulfillment of party and service duty, to boldly oppose passivity, complacency and self-satisfaction, to resolutely oppose lack of principle, sham and lack of objectivity in the assessment of achievement. This is especially important now, since a new training year has begun. Those commanders, political organs and party organizations are acting with principle when they not only give due credit to the acknowledged leaders in the combat and political training, but also name those who failed to fulfill their commitments or fell back, thoroughly disclose the causes of such a situation, see that the shortcomings are not repeated in the new situation and define ways to move forward.

One of the important demands based on principle, which are made of the communists, is that he struggle tirelessly and persistently to enhance military discipline. Discipline, as we know, forms the basis of combat readiness. Without it success in the

training is inconceivable and victory in battle is impossible. The role of strict and efficient performance, the highest level of organization in the life of the troops, unshakable order, absolute and precise execution of orders has become even greater with the development of the equipment and of military affairs. V.I. Lenin's statement about the need for military discipline and military vigilance developed to the highest degree is especially important today. The importance of undeviating adherence to discipline and organization on the part of each collective and each worker was especially stressed at the 26th CPSU Congress and the November Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. The need to be a real champion of firm military discipline is the one principle from which the communist may not deviate one bit.

One can imagine the damage done to the struggle for strict regulation order if the communists fall back in this matter. And we still encounter cases of this. It was pointed out at the report-and-election meeting in the party organization in which officer Ye. Shchetko is a bureau member, that some CPSU members had party and disciplinary penalties, but that few people were really troubled about this: Only certain individuals were involved, after all. The meeting pointed out the fallacy of this position. We must not be reassured by the fact that deviations from the requirements governing military and party life are not typical of the vast majority of communists. A CPSU member who behaves in an unsuitable manner and ignores party principle damages the great title of fighter in the Lenin party and loses his ability to influence those around him.

Political maturity and principle are also indicated by whether a party member of candidate member has a sense of responsibility not only for his own service, actions and deeds, but also for the service, actions and deeds of his comrades, whether he uses his personal influence on them, concerns himself with the common success, with maintaining a wholesome moral climate in the collective. The communists are, after all, the main support of the commanders in the accomplishment of the training tasks, the improvement of combat and political training, the training and indoctrination of the personnel. It was said of the party fighters at the front that there were no cowards around them. The succession of traditions gives us the right to say now that there should be no laggards around the communists. This is a demand of the times. It is dictated by the need for good combat readiness, which depends upon the contribution each individual makes to the strengthening of that readiness. Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense, had the following to say to the fightingmen of one Guards regiment: "There are outstanding fightingmen and good subunits in your regiment. There are also laggards. Why is this so? How can the party and Komsomol organizations reconcile themselves to this situation?" More than one party and Komsomol organization should ask themselves this question.

Devotion to principle is not an inborn quality of man. It is constantly developed in every communist. Ideological conviction forms the foundation for conduct based on principle on the part of every worker. In the words of F.E. Dzerzhinskiy, ideological conviction is a sacred feeling, more powerful than all the other feelings, more powerful by virtue of its moral mandate: "This is how you should live and this is the way you should be." An individual of profound ideological conviction will not neglect his views and convictions, will not place personal gain above the common cause, will not avoid difficulties, not avoid answering a pointed question or give himself over to regressive attitudes. Such an individual is by nature a fighter and not a passive observer indifferent to good and bad. The CPSU member strives persistently to master

Marxist-Leninist theory and the laws governing social development, thoroughly studies the policy of the Communist Party and the demands it makes of the Armed Forces, and devotes his abilities, knowledge and energy to his assigned job. A solid meld of knowledge and action constitutes one of the main indicators of ideological conviction and principle on the part of a communist.

The qualities of a party fighter are acquired in a climate of strict collective demandingness with respect to deeds and actions, and the demandingness is not simply applied at random, but continuously and systematically. The party organization has numerous means of increasing demandingness toward the communists. For example, it would be difficult to overstate the importance of hearing reports from comrades on the service, the training and the fulfillment of their duty, of talking with them on a regular basis. These things prompt party members and candidate members to assess their own work more strictly, to analyze and search. The indoctrination of all communists in a spirit of devotion to principle also depends greatly upon the atmosphere in the primary party organization, where they receive their real conditioning, upon the development of earnest criticism based on principle. The meetings provide the best platform for this. It is a good thing for the party members to frequently discuss the qualities of a Lenin party fighter, the sense of responsibility for the assigned job, the observance of standards of party life and principles of party leadership.

The communist is an integrated individual. He is an active fighter everywhere and at all times. This is why the party organization is far from indifferent as to how the party member or candidate member conducts himself in his personal life, how he treats his family, what he studies and how well he learns it. And if, when he removes his uniform, the individual seems also to discard organization, restraint and modesty, this means that he is phoney, does not have an integrated personality. It is reasonable to ask such a person what his real face is like. The value of convictions is not great if they are only manifested in order to create the appearance of order and honor. This task arises of its own: to strive persistently to establish the fine principles which are a part of the moral code of the builder of communism, both in the service and in one's personal life, to engage frequently in a discussion of ethics and morals, to discuss them from a standpoint of principle.

A high level of universal demandingness of any communist, including the one in charge, is undoubtedly the best assurance that he will base his behavior on principle, everywhere and in all things. It is also obvious, however, that demandingness of the people must be combined with Leninist sensitivity toward them, with concern for them. Do we need to talk about how support for an individual's position of principle and his creative undertakings, attention to his plans and initiative reinforce his abilities? When an individual speaks out against simplifications in the combat training, refuses to accept lack of discipline, the glossing over of shortcomings and the theft of military property, condemns ideologically harmful views alien to us or involves himself in putting an end to an abnormal phenomenon, he has performed an important and necessary deed. And a work of approval will convince everyone even more that the party organization will stand behind anyone who speaks out against and combats deviations from order. The prestige of these people will increase, and their ranks will grow.

V.I. Lenin, founder of the Communist Party and the Soviet State, was and is for us a model of great devotion to principle. His entire life, all his actions and thoughts were subordinate to the struggle for socialism and communism. In this struggle he was

determined, unwavering and steadfast. V.I. Lenin taught all the party fighters the same kind of purposiveness and consistency. They are growing, developing and becoming stronger today on the unshakable foundation of Lenin's principles. "We will always be unwaveringly loyal to the Leninist standards and principles, which have become firmly established in the life of the party and the state," Comrade Yu.V. Andropov underscored at the November 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

Principle is a valuable quality in the communist. To possess this quality means to honorably fulfill the important commitments and the great mission of a fighter in the Lenin party, to give one's all to the struggle for a triumph of communist ideals, for the steady strengthening of our homeland's defense capability and enhancement of the readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

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HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF STALINGRAD BATTLE

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[Article by Hero of the Soviet Union Col Gen A. Zheltov, military consultant to the Group of Inspectors-General of the USSR Ministry of Defense, chairman of the Soviet Committee of War Veterans: "The Valor of Stalingrad Will Not Fade Through the Centuries"]

[Text] The Battle of Stalingrad, which had no equal in military history, ended 4 decades ago on 2 February 1943 on the banks of the great Russian river, where the brilliant victory was won by the Soviet people and their Armed Forces. The battle between Soviet forces and the fascist invaders, fierce, gigantic in scope and intensity and in the size of the forces and means involved, continued for six and a half months, 200 days and nights, over an enormous territory between the Volga and the Don. More than 2 million soldiers, over 25,000 guns and mortars, thousands of aircraft, tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces were involved on both sides.

The Soviet Union steadfastly withstood the powerful onslaught by armies of the criminal bloc of fascist aggressors. Our nation's ability to smash the presumptuous seekers of world supremacy was demonstrated in the reflected flames of the Stalingrad Battle, which the entire world followed with bated breath. The Soviet people's fervent patriotism and mass heroism, unbending will and valor were demonstrated in all their grandeur before an amazed world.

Our nation won that battle with an incredible effort on the part of the people, at a price of heavy losses and deprivations, through the selflessness of workers in the rear area, steadfastness and heroism on the part of Stalingrad's armed defenders. After weakening the elite units and formations of the invaders, Soviet forces then switched to a counteroffensive, routed five fascist bloc armies, encircled and smashed a 330,000-man enemy grouping. A total of 1.5 million soldiers and officers of the Hitlerites and their satellites were killed, wounded, imprisoned or missing in action. This was one fourth of their forces operating on the Soviet-German front.

The Armed Forces of the USSR inflicted a devastating defeat upon the German fascist invaders, from which Hitlerite Germany could not recover. The offensive momentum and moral of the Wehrmacht were broken. A basic turning point was achieved in the Great Patriotic War, in World War II in general. The Soviet command took solid control of

the strategic initiative. The mass expulsion of the enemy from territory it occupied in our homeland was begun. The victory at Stalingrad raised the Soviet Nation's international prestige even higher, helped to intensify the struggle being waged against fascism by the enslaved peoples of Europe and strengthened the position of the anti-Hitlerite coalition. It produced a major moral-political upheaval in the enemy's nation and undermined the faith of Germany's allies in it.

The victory in the Battle of Stalingrad was convincing confirmation of the indomitable vital force of the socialist system and the Soviet State, the monolithic solidarity and selfless devotion of the Soviet Union's peoples to the cause of the Communist Party, the gigantic combat strength of our Armed Forces. We rightly call this great victory a historic feat. The real extent of any feat, however, is only recognized when we have a clear picture of the exceptionally difficult situation in which it was performed.

Chronologically, the Battle of Stalingrad is divided up into two periods: the defensive period, which lasted from 17 July to 18 November 1942, and the offensive period, from 19 November 1942 to 2 February 1943.

Following Germany's large defeat at Moscow and the failure of its plans and designs on other sectors of the Soviet-German front, Germany's fascist bosses decided to achieve their far-reaching political and strategic goals in the summer of 1942. "This summer the Soviets will be totally destroyed. They can no longer be saved," Hitler boasted before the beginning of the summer campaign.

Taking advantage of the absence of a second front in Europe, the German command transferred over 40 additional divisions to the east and launched a general offensive at the end of June on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front. The enemy wanted to capture the oil fields of the Caucasus and the fertile areas of the Don and the Kuban, to take Stalingrad and move up to the Volga from Stalingrad to Astrakhan. By cutting off the lines of communication and roads linking the center of the nation's European part with the Caucasus, it hoped to bring the USSR to economic collapse. By mid-July the fascist hordes, suffering large losses, had captured the Donbass and Rostov, forced the Don in the south, reached Voronezh and the great bend in the Don and created an immediate threat to Stalingrad and the North Caucasus.

Our nation's situation remained difficult. Territory on which around 80 million people had lived prior to the war was under fascist occupation. We were deprived of large industrial and agricultural areas, where a third of our annual industrial output and 800 million poods of grain were produced, where approximately half of all our livestock was located. Further successes for the enemy could have even more serious consequences. The conquests of Great October, the fate of the Soviet State and of our people were threatened.

The Communist Party openly and honestly told the Soviet people about the situation. The homeland demanded maximum effort, indestructible spirit and the greatest self-sacrifice of Stalingrad's defenders. Its command was the following: "Not a step backward!". "To retreat further," Order No. 227 issued by the People's Commissariat of Defense stated, "will be the ruin of yourselves together with our homeland... Not a step backward! This must now be our main plea." And the Stalingraders held out while there was life left in them.

The more than 500 kilometers of Stalingrad front created on 12 July had to withstand the frenzied onslaught of the German fascist invaders. The 62nd, 63rd and 64th Armies placed in the front out of the reserve of Headquarters, Supreme High Command, were moved to the distant approaches to the city. On 17 July forward detachments of the front engaged the enemy for the first time on a line between the Chir and Tsimla rivers. And while Paulus' 6th Field Army had advanced at a rate of 30 kilometers per day during the week preceding this, the enemy advanced only 60-80 kilometers during the month of 17 July to 17 August, paying for this with the lives of thousands of soldiers and officers. These losses occurred despite the fact that the enemy considerably surpassed us in personnel, artillery, tanks and aircraft.

On the Don steppes the summer of '42 was a hot one in both the literal and the figurative senses of the word. The temperature reached 40 degrees. The Hitlerites directed torrents of bombs, shells and grenades against the positions of our troops. Soviet soldiers, commanders and political workers performed like real heroes in those fierce battles, however.

During that difficult time I was a member of the 63rd Army's military council, later a member of the military council of the Don Front and beginning at the end of October, of the Southwestern Front. During those critical days we became more and more convinced of the correctness of V.I. Lenin's astute words: "That people will never be defeated, in which the majority of workers and peasants recognize, feel and see that they are defending their own, Soviet power...." With unprecedented heroism, valor and fearlessness yesterday's workers, kolkhoz workers and intelligentsia defended every inch of their native land. Ideological conviction and devotion to the homeland, the iron stoicism of our fightingmen and their loyalty to duty and to the military oath permitted the platoon and company at half-strength or less to fight to the death against a fascist battalion or regiment.

The 15 soldiers led by Junior Lieutenant V.D. Kochetkov received an order to hold a hill at Dubovyy Farm until reinforcements arrived. They fought off five fierce attacks by a company of Hitlerites. The next day 12 tanks advanced on the small group of brave soldiers, who did not even have an anti-tank rifle. The unequal battle was a fierce one. The Soviet fightingmen knocked out four of the machines. Only four of the hill's defenders were left alive, however: M.P. Stepanenko, V.A. Chirkov, M.A. Shuktomov and the seriously wounded V.D. Kochetkov. The ammunition ran out. The fightingmen placed their commander on the bottom of the trench and threw themselves under the tanks with their last strings of grenades. Six of the enemy's steel machines were smoldering on a slope of the hill when reinforcements arrived.

Anti-tank gunners Aleynikov, Belyakov and Somoylov led by Guards Junior Sergeant Petr Boloto, a communist, performed an amazing feat by entering into single combat with 30 tanks and destroying half of them. The 30 tanks could not cross a line held by only four Soviet soldiers!

Stalingrad's defenders fought not just with unprecedented courage, but also with growing vigor and combat skill. They took advantage of the slightest opportunity to counterattack the enemy, to inflict the greatest possible losses. At the end of August, after beating off a fierce onslaught by fascist forces, formations of the 63rd and 21st Armies (commanded by Generals V.I. Kuznetsov and I.M. Chistyakov) themselves

switched to an offensive in the area of Seramovich. After crushing the enemy they forced the Don and captured bridgeheads on the right bank. From these bridgeheads the forces of the two armies made attacks against the enemy, pinning down enemy forces each time the fighting in the city was stepped up.

Ignoring their enormous losses, the German fascist invaders pushed furiously toward Stalingrad. The Politburo of VKP(b) All-Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) Central Committee, the State Defense Committee, Headquarters, Supreme High Command, the military councils of the Stalingrad, Southeastern and Don Fronts and the Stalingrad party obkom and gorkom took every possible step to prevent the enemy forces from capturing the city. Headquarters, Supreme High Command, moved up the 24th and 66th Armies (commanded by Generals D.T. Kozlov and R.Ya. Malinovskiy) out of its reserve, and they, together with the armies of the Stalingrad Front, made a flanking counter-attack against the enemy from the north. The Hitlerites were forced to transfer some of their tanks, artillery, aircraft and motorcycle forces from the Stalingrad area to hinder our offensive. The armies holding back the enemy's onslaught on the northwestern and southeastern lines of defense continued to pin down substantial forces with active combat operations and made any sacrifice to help their comrades-in-arms fighting at the walls of Stalingrad and later, in the city itself. Airmen of the 8th and 16th Air Armies commanded by Generals T.T. Khryukin and S.I. Rudenko inflicted significant damage upon the enemy.

City and oblast workers, party and soviet organs had a large role in the defense of Stalingrad. During the very first year of the war the Stalingrad party organization sent 33,000 communists to the front, while the oblast Komsomol sent 60,000 of its members. A total of 225,000 blue-collar, kolkhos and white-collar workers, housewives and young students worked with combat engineer units and military construction organizations to build four defense lines with a combined length of 3,860 kilometers. Under continuous bombings and artillery shellings workers of the Traktornyy, "Krasnyy Okt'yabr" and "Barrikady," ship-building and other enterprises produced and repaired tanks, guns, mortars and machine-guns and turned out ammunition. Shoulder to shoulder with the soldiers, thousands of Stalingraders defended the city with weapon in hand. The party obkom, which was headed by first secretary A.S. Chuyanov, performed an enormous amount of organizational and indoctrinational work to mobilize the city and rural populations to repel the enemy.

The most difficult trials in the Battle of Stalingrad fell to the lot of fightingmen of the 62nd and 64th Armies (commanded by Generals V.I. Chuykov and M.S. Shumilov, and with K.A. Gurov and Z.T. Serdyuk as members of their military councils), which were fighting in the city, during the September, October and November offensive. From the middle of September, when fierce street fighting broke out in Stalingrad, a mortal skirmish with the enemy, which no words can describe, went on day and night, for every building and every meter of territory. Apparently taking revenge for the fact that they had been unable to take the city from the march, the Hitlerites set themselves the goal of demolishing it down to the foundation. Beginning on 23 August they carried out massive air raids against Stalingrad, sometimes involving as many as 2,000-3,000 sorties per day. There was probably not a spot of land in the city where a bomb or a shell had not exploded.

Despite their enormous superiority in strength, however, the fascists were unable to capture the city. The divisions of Generals S.S. Gur'yev, V.G. Zholudev and A.I.

Rodimtsev and Colonels I.I. Lyudnikov, V.A. Gorishnyy, I.Ye. Yermolkin, N.F. Batyuk and L.N. Gurt'yev fought to the death. Sniper Vasiliy Zaytsev's inspiring words "There is no ground beyond the Volga for Us!" became the vital stance of fightingmen of the 62nd and 64th Armies, of all Stalingrad's defenders. Every day the fightingmen and their commanders demonstrated heroism, fearlessness and a readiness to sacrifice themselves.

Sailors of the Volga Military Flotilla provided the city's defenders with appreciable assistance. They provided fire support from the ships and delivered troops, equipment and ammunition from the left bank under bombings and artillery shellings, in a situation made difficult by mines and ice. During the fiercest battles of September and October the flotilla's motor gunboats and vessels, together with the combat engineer units, moved the 13th Guards Rifle Division and the 138th Rifle Division into the city.

The communists were the motivating and binding force in the Battle of Stalingrad from the first to the final day. They set an example of courage and fearlessness for their comrades and took the party word into the masses of fightingmen. In the name of the Lenin party, the name most dear and respected by the Soviet individual, the communists called upon the fightingmen to defend to the death, to scorn mortal danger, attack and destroy the numerically superior enemy. Most importantly, however, everything they asked the others to do, they themselves did first. They were the first to begin attacks, to go to meet the torrent of bullets and fragments. They were the first to perform missions involving great risk, with little hope of remaining alive.

The more difficult the situation on the fronts and the fiercer the combat operations, the more troops announced their desire to enter the party, to share with it responsibility for the fate of the homeland. During 3 months of stiff fighting party organizations of the 67th Army alone received around 10,000 requests for acceptance into the VKP(b) ranks from soldiers and commanders. The young communists vowed not to give up the sites where they were presented their party cards, and they honorably fulfilled their vow.

A large amount of party-political work was conducted in the forces even in the most difficult situation. The work was based on the party's demands, the essence of which was reflected in the slogan "Not a step backward!". These words were recorded in resolutions adopted at party and Komsomol meetings and were an inviolable law governing the conduct of the communists in battle.

Guards Major General A.I. Rodimtsev, commander of a division which entered directly into combat after crossing the river, who declared: "I am a communist. I do not intend to leave from here, and I will not.", Lieutenant Colonel Ustinov, regimental commander and party member, who called down fire upon his own command post encircled by Hitlerites, Private Pecherskiy, a young communist who covered the embrasure of an enemy permanent pillbox with his own body, and hundreds and thousands of other party members, who did not spare themselves in combat to save the homeland, set with their conduct that kind of moral example which ignites the hearts of people and incites them to perform feats.

Commanders and political workers, party and Komsomol organizations reached every individual, took all steps necessary to make each soldier aware of the fact that he was

personally responsible for the fate of Stalingrad, for the fate of his socialist homeland. Information from political reports and reports from the central and front press on the heroic feats of Stalingrad's defenders, and letters from workers in the rear arriving from the Moscow area, Siberia, from the Far East, from the republics of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, from all corners of our immense nation, were used extensively in the party-political work.

Daily, vital communication with the fightingmen, clarification for them of the party's demands and the situation on the fronts, the study of their moods, needs and requests, concern for supplying the troops with ammunition, food and water, with sending the wounded to the rear were the main elements in the indoctrinational work performed by commanders, political organs and the party aktiv. Members of the 63rd Army's military council, chief of the army's political section S.P. Karamyshev and the chiefs and workers of formation political organs spent a great deal of time at forward positions. I had the opportunity to work with General S.F. Galadzhiev, chief of the Don Front's political directorate, only a short time, a month in all. An erudite and thoroughly trained political worker, he was bursting with energy and possessed enviable cheerfulness. With his personal example he taught the unit political workers how to create fighting spirit, how to improve the morale of the troops. K.F. Telegin, V.M. Layok, M.V. Rudakov, I.S. Galesnichenko and many other political workers of the fronts and armies, with whom I shared common work and concerns during the awesome days of the Stalingrad Battle, proved themselves to be skillful organizers of vital, focused and effective party-political work in the difficult combat situation.

The front military councils and political organs did an enormous amount of work to implement the ukase issued by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 9 October 1943 on the establishment of total one-man command in the Armed Forces. They made the fightingmen aware of the importance and the meaning of this large party measure, thoroughly reinforced the authority of the commanders and explained to the fightingmen that the commander's order was a command from the homeland, that it must be executed at any cost. The political organs also helped the commanders and political workers to give the party-political work even greater scope, to fill it with profound ideological substance.

Fierce defense battles were still underway, when Headquarters, Supreme High Command, and the General Staff began working out the offensive operation "Uran," taking into account suggestions from the command of the fronts. The operation plan was prepared in complete secrecy. Generals G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevskiy and N.N. Voronov, representatives of Headquarters, played a large role in its development, in the explanation of the missions to the fronts and the preparation of the offensive. The plan for the counteroffensive was the following: Troops covering the flanks of the enemy's assault grouping were to be routed with attacks by the Southwestern Front, newly created on 25 October, and the Don Front from bridgeheads in the areas of Serafimovich and Kletskaya, and by the Stalingrad Front from the area of the Sarpinskiye Lakes to the south of Stalingrad, the offensive was to be developed on converging axes toward Kalach and Sovetskiv, and the main enemy forces operating in and near Stalingrad were to be encircled and destroyed. As we know, this plan was successfully carried out.

Preparation of the counteroffensive was made difficult by the fact that it was accomplished while our forces were engaged in active defense, secretly and within an extremely short period of time, and the time for the beginning of combat operations was kept secret until the very last day.

I met Lieutenant General N.F. Vatutin, commander of the Southwestern Front, for the first time on 28 October. He had arrived from the Voronezh Front. Veteran military chiefs tested in battle were appointed chief of staff for the front and commanders of the branches of troops. The headquarters and the field directorate for the front had to be created and pieced together out of the staff of the 1st Guards Army, and a large quantity of troops and combat equipment had to be received and prepared for the offensive. We were given only 3 weeks to accomplish all of this.

The circumstances made it necessary to restructure the party-political work. In the 1st Guards Army (formerly the 63rd) and the 21st Army, which had fought a long time in the defensive battles on the Don, it was important to prepare the personnel psychologically to switch to an offensive, while at the same time giving some combat experience to numerous new replacements of fightingmen, commanders and political workers, who made up as much as 60% of the numerical strength in certain formations. In the newly arrived 5th Tank Army and 17th Air Army commanded by Generals P.L. Romanenko and S.A. Krasovskiy, we had to train the command and political staff, to decide how to distribute the communists and use political means to further the intensive preparation of the fightingmen for battle.

During those busy days the members of the front's military council and workers with the political directorate spent days on end performing organizational and indoctrinational work at unloading points for troops and equipment, in the formations and units and on the training fields. The military councils and political section chiefs of the armies properly oriented the party-political organization toward the shifting of focus in the political work to the companies, batteries, platoons and crews.

The front's political directorate and the army political sections devoted special attention to the creation of a reliable reserve of political workers and to the strengthening of lower-level party and Komsomol organizations. They strove to see that every subunit had battle worthy party and Komsomol organizations, that the communists and Komsomol members were properly distributed. Prior the offensive, for example, the 21st Army had 841 company or equivalent party organizations and 1,158 Komsomol organizations. At party and Komsomol meetings held in all the units and subunits the communists and Komsomol members promised to fight the hated enemy, sparing neither their blood nor their very lives.

The multifaceted organizational, political and indoctrinational work performed by the military councils of the front and the armies, the political organs of formations, commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations of units and subunits produced the proper combat training, discipline and organization and a good fighting mood in the personnel. They were burning with desire to enter into decisive combat and defeat the enemy.

The Southwestern and Don Fronts commanded by Lieutenant Generals N.F. Vatutin and K.K. Rokossovskiy switched to an offensive on 19 November, followed by the Stalingrad Front commanded by Colonel General A.I. Yeremenko on 20 November. Breaking the enemy's stiff resistance, they joined forces at the designated area on 23 November, as called for by the operation plan, and encircled 22 divisions and more than 160 separate units of the Stalingrad grouping of Hitlerites. The fascist troops fought with the desperation of doomed men. Despite this our units at the inner perimeter of envelopment had reduced the circle by 30 November to less than one half the territory the encircled enemy had

held. The outer perimeter of encirclement had also advanced. Determined operations by Soviet troops and aircraft frustrated the German's attempts to relieve the encircled grouping with a strike from the area of Kotel'nikovskiy and to supply Paulus' army by means of an "airbridge." Troops of the Stalingrad Front halted an offensive by the army group "Goth" on the river Myshkova, and then routed the enemy's Kotel'nikovskiy grouping between 24 and 31 December, driving the remains across the river Manych. We launched an offensive on the Middle Don on 16 December. By the end of the month forces of the Southwestern Front and the left wing of the Voronezh Front had defeated the main forces of the Italian 8th Army, the operations group "Hollidt" and the remains of the Romanian 3rd Army. Our units and formations had advanced 150-200 kilometers. They had created conditions conducive to the elimination of the encircled enemy forces at Stalingrad. After the enemy rejected an offer of capitulation on 10 January, forces of the Don Front began operation "Kol'tso." They broke up and defeated the enemy grouping with a powerful attack, taking as prisoners 91,000 enemy soldiers and officers.

The Stalingrad victory achieved by the Soviet people and their Armed Forces was greatly appreciated by all progressive mankind. In many states cities, squares and streets have been given the name "Stalingrad" in honor of this historic event. Since the war, however, bourgeois falsifiers of history, as though they have forgotten the facts, have made a great effort to belittle the importance of the great victory, to distort its meaning. They have placed the historic battle on the Volga alongside other, less important engagements of World War II, and have attempted to attribute the catastrophic defeat of the German fascist forces to miscalculations on the part of Hitler, to the weakness of the armies of Germany's allies, to the Russian cold and to other secondary circumstances. From the pinnacle of the 4 decades we see even more clearly the deliberate falsity and groundlessness of all these and other fabrications.

The victory at Stalingrad was a natural result of the gigantic organizational and political work performed by the Communist Party and its Central Committee, which succeeded in turning the nation into a single combat camp, placing the economy onto a military footing, mobilizing and inspiring the Soviet people to defeat the enemy.

This was a victory for the new social and state order, Marxist-Leninist ideology, the moral-political unity of the Soviet society, Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism, friendship of peoples of the USSR and the socialist economy. The weapons were forged for it through the efforts of all nations and nationalities of the Soviet Nation. Under extremely difficult conditions our industry had increased tank production 8-fold over the pre-war level by November 1942, artillery guns--6.3-fold, mortars--10.2-fold, aircraft--3.7-fold, small arms--4.3-fold. Shoulder to shoulder, the fighting sons of all the fraternal republics routed the hated enemy.

The victory at Stalingrad made completely clear the superiority of the Soviet military organization, of Soviet military art and Soviet strategic leadership. Headquarters, Supreme High Command, the General Staff and our military chiefs outdid the German fascist command with respect to assessing the military-political situation, organizing and conducting large defensive and offensive operations, selecting the time and place for the main strike and utilizing all services of the Armed Forces and branches of troops.

Party-political work had a great role in the achievement of the victory. Members of the CPSU Central Committee, prominent political and state leaders, commanders, members of the military councils, chiefs of front political directorates, chiefs of political organs of armies, divisions and brigades, and political workers of units and subunits took a direct part in that work. The good ideological and political conditioning of

the people strengthened their faith that the enemy would be defeated and their undeviating will for victory, and gave birth to mass heroism, courage and valor.

The heroes of Stalingrad suffered all sacrifices and deprivations and performed immortal feats for the sake of their beloved homeland's freedom and independence, for the sake of its continued flourishing. They won immortal glory. The historic feat accomplished by them will live throughout the centuries not only as a brilliant example of military valor, but also as a warning to those who would declare "crusades" against socialism and entertain thoughts of a new world war.

The sharp sword in the hands of the maternal homeland, flashing over the Mamayev Mound, will remind people of the immortal of Stalingrad," Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR minister of defense, has commented. "This sword is not a weapon of aggression but a weapon of defense. It is formidable to our nation's foes, however, as it was in those distant war years. Let this not be forgotten by those who like military adventures, all those who would encroach upon the peace and security of peoples."

When we meet today's defenders of the socialist homeland, we veterans of the Great Patriotic War, of the Battle of Stalingrad, are convinced with a sense of profound satisfaction that they are honorably continuing the glorious combat traditions of the older generations. They now have different, more powerful weapons and improved equipment. In the hearts of the fightingmen, however, lives that same infinite devotion to the Communist Party, that same fervent love for the homeland. That same readiness to fulfill their sacred duty, to overwhelm an aggressor at any moment and in any situation, even the most difficult, is characteristic of them, of today's sentries guarding socialism's conquests.

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DON FRONT ARCHIVAL DATA CITED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 2, Jan 83 (signed to press 3 Jan 83)
pp 32-33

[Article by Col A. Tarasenko, deputy chief of the Department of History of the CPSU at the Kamyshin Higher Military Construction Command School: "They Defended the Volga Stronghold"]

[Text] "The unrelenting wind buffeted their faces, but they continued to advance, and once more the enemy was gripped by a sense of superstitious fear. Was it human beings attacking? Were they mortal?"--these lines are engraved on one of the monument walls on Mamayev Mound. They are addressed to those who gave their own lives to defend Stalingrad, whose immortal feats have been written down for eternity in the history of the battle at the walls of the legendary city. About whom the songs and poems were composed. They were people who achieved what would have appeared to be impossible. Soviet soldiers. Fightingmen of our great and unconquerable homeland.

At that time the communists bore the main brunt of the fighting, bore special responsibility for the fate of the homeland. They were the first to attack and the last to pull out. Not all of them did....

We cannot halt the flow of time. There are fewer and fewer of the veterans left who performed the immortal military feat there on the banks of the great Russian river. I have had the opportunity to speak with many of them. The grandeur of the feat performed by the Stalingraders became even more apparent to me, however, when I saw documents of the Don Front kept at the Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense. I carefully read the brief reports and orders and listened to the names of the heroes who had marched into immortality. I never ceased to be amazed and elated by the courage demonstrated by the people, by their devotion to the party cause, by their faith in its powerful strength.

Fightingmen and commanders wanted only one thing--to crush the hated enemy as rapidly as possible, to destroy the German fascist hoards. And they wanted to do this as just a small part of the great Lenin party. The fightingmen accepted into the party set examples of courage and heroism during those days.

...Before one of the battles the party organization of the 69th Tank Brigade received 20 requests for acceptance into the ranks of the VKP(b)[All-Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)]. Fourteen of those who submitted these requests died the death of the

brave in that battle. This is what tank commander D. Vorob'yev wrote in his application, as an example: "I request the party bureau to accept me as a candidate member of the VKP(b), since I want to go into battle as a communist. I vow not to bring shame upon this great title in the battle and swear that I will justify the title with honor and dignity in the combat."

The tank brigade accomplished its assigned mission, inflicting considerable losses upon the fascists. All of the crews fought heroically. After the battle the battalion party organizations reviewed the applications from the fightingmen who were killed and resolved "...that they be considered worthy of the Bolshevik title, who indeed demonstrated their disregard for death for the sake of liberating the homeland from the fascist occupiers." D. Vorob'yev became a communist posthumously.

...The party organization of the 14th Tank Regiment received 24 applications for party membership on 10 January 1943, prior to the offensive. A total of 20 fightingmen were accepted into the party during the fighting between 10 and 27 January. Six of those accepted into the party were awarded orders and medals, the others were recommended for awards. During just a week of combat operations tankmen of the regiment put out of action and burned 16 tanks and two self-propelled pieces and destroyed 32 guns, 54 permanent pillboxes and covered trenches, 61 machine guns and four mortar batteries of the enemy. A total of 1,300 fascist soldiers and officers ended their inglorious careers during those days.

Numbers, numbers.... That is precisely how the archival materials speak to us today. And this is not an unfeeling language at all. It is understandable to me and to my colleagues, the instructors and cadets at our school. It is understandable and dear to all of us fightingmen of the 1980s who are continuing the traditions of the older generations and taking the war heroes and their feats as our example. This is why every new number excites us, tells us a great deal and makes us think about many things. First of all, it makes us think about the place which we communists must assume in life and in the service, what qualities we must possess. One reads the documents of those awesome war years, learns about people who are no longer among us and automatically places himself alongside them, asking "could I have done the same...?".

Heroism. A great deal has been said and written about it. As always, however, we must make special mention of the heroism demonstrated by party members. The communists enjoyed great prestige during those unprecedented days and nights of the Stalingrad Battle. And it was earned by nothing other than heroism, fearlessness and a readiness to sacrifice themselves for the common cause.

...Party organizer Kobayakov of the 3rd company of the 293rd Rifle Division's 1036th Regiment led the fightingmen forward under powerful enemy fire, assuring the successful elimination of a large group of fascists. The communist died in that battle.

...In one of the fierce battles fought for hill 190.1 by a battalion of the 14th Guards Rifle Division, the battalion commander was seriously wounded. The battalion's left flank was forced under enemy pressure to withdraw to the eastern slopes of the hill. Battalion commissar Nikolayev rushed to their location and rallied the fightingmen for an attack. With a swift rush the fightingmen overran the enemy. The battalion commissar was mortally wounded in one of the subsequent attacks. The last word to escape his parched lips was "Forward!...."

Communists of the Don Front, like those on all the sectors of the Great Patriotic War, were the people whom others tried to emulate in battle. They inspired their loyal assistants, the Komsomol members, to perform feats as well. The youth, matured in battle, tried to be worthy of their older comrades.

During the offensive the 422th Rifle Division's 1334th Rifle Regiment was counterattacked near Kharausun-Damba by more than 30 enemy tanks. Some of the regiment's subunits began to withdraw. At that point one of the companies, made up mostly of Komsomol members, was assigned the mission of preventing the fascist tanks from getting through. The young fightingmen demonstrated enviable restraint. They permitted the fascist tanks to approach to within 50 meters and then began shelling them pointblank. Seven enemy tanks became smoking torches on the field. Komsomol members Chaynikov, Gorlin and Nusanov fired accurately and mercilessly. The Hitlerites' counterattack failed.

In just 10 days of fighting 32 Komsomol members of the 1334th Rifle Regiment were recommended for high government awards.

...Senior Lieutenant Petrov, assistant chief for Komsomol work of the 51st Rifle Brigade's political section, was in one of the battalions during the offensive. The infantrymen were attacked by two enemy regiments supported by 40 tanks. The battalion commander and his deputy for political affairs were killed. The situation was critical. The Komsomol leader made the decision to assume command of the battalion and roused the infantrymen for a counterattack. The battalion held out 3 days, repelling all of the enemy's attempts to destroy the subunit and break through into the brigade's rear area. The valorous Komsomol leader was awarded the Order of the Red Star for his skilful leadership of the combat operations.

The feats performed by the Komsomol members, their determination and fearlessness in battle inspired the youth and increased the prestige of the Lenin Komsomol. It is not surprising that many of the fightingmen applied for membership in the Komsomol during the period of fighting. An especially large number of these applications were received prior to crucial battles. In December of 1942 Komsomol organizations of the Don Front had 48,506, while the number had increased to 56,726 by January of 1943, and that of primary Komsomol organizations had grown by 314. During the entire period of the Stalingrad Battle Komsomol organizations of the Don Front accepted more than 30,000 young fightingmen into their ranks.

A total of 7,436 of the Don Front's Komsomol members were awarded orders and medals for heroism and courage demonstrated at Stalingrad. Three Komsomol members were awarded the great title Hero of the Soviet Union.

The Battle of Stalingrad.... It has gone down for eternity in the history of our homeland, in the glorious chronicle of the Soviet Armed Forces. It is written with the names of the communists and Komsomol members, those who defended the Volga stronghold, those who were victorious.

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OUTLINE FOR LECTURE ON MARXISM-LENINISM

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 2, Jan 83 (signed to press 3 Jan 83)
pp 82-88

[Article by Col V. Merkulov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor: "Marxism-Leninism--the Banner of the Struggle for the Workers' Interests, for Communism and Peace"]

[Text] The study of this subject is designed to help the students gain a deeper understanding of the outstanding role of K. Marx and his talented associate F. Engels as teachers of the proletariat, of V.I. Lenin's historic contribution to the further development of Marxism's revolutionary theory and its implementation, and of the enormous theoretical and practical work performed by the CPSU toward the creative enhancement and implementation of the concepts of scientific communism's founders.

A total of 4 hours is allocated for this subject. Two of these should be used for lecturing (narration) and two for a seminar (discussion of the subject). Self-preparation in the groups should be scheduled during the evening.

The following topics should be covered in the lecture (narration): 1. K. Marx and F. Engels--the Founders of Scientific Atheism; 2. Leninism-Marxism of the Contemporary Era; 3. CPSU Policy--Marxism-Leninism in Action.

The students should be reminded in a brief introductory statement that on 14 March 1883 the heart ceased to beat in K. Marx, teacher of the world proletariat, who, in collaboration with his loyal companion-in-arms Friedrich Engels, created the theory of scientific communism. The remarkable lives of those two titans of revolutionary thinking and action were devoted totally and entirely to liberating the workers from the oppression of capital.

Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, genius and successor to K. Marx and F. Engels in their revolutionary teachings, creatively developed all the elements of Marxism. An entire revolutionary era in the life of man is linked with his name. V.I. Lenin provided answers to the most urgent questions raised in the course of historical development, thoroughly developed the theory of the socialist revolution and the building of a communist society, armed the Russian and the entire international revolutionary movement with a scientifically based strategy and tactics, and led the struggle of the working class to put the ideals of socialism into practice. Socialism, transformed from a utopian concept to

a science by K. Marx and F. Engels and enhanced by V.I. Lenin with new conclusions and discoveries, has been incorporated into social practices on a worldwide historical scale and become the main revolutionary force of our times.

1. K. Marx and F. Engels--the Founders of Scientific Communism

When the instructor begins his presentation of the first topic he must point out that V.I. Lenin called Marxism the sum total of the views and ideas of K. Marx and F. Engels. The doctrine they developed constitutes an integral world outlook, a smoothly structured system of philosophical, economic and sociopolitical views. The philosophy of dialectical materialism, political economy and scientific communism are inextricable elements of this doctrine.

Combining materialism and dialectics into one, K. Marx and F. Engels extended its principles to the cognition of social processes, thereby making the philosophy an active, transforming process. "The philosophers have only explained the world in various ways," K. Marx wrote in his famous "Theses on Feuerbach," "but what we need to do is change it." (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." Works, Vol. 3, p. 4).

Demonstrating the decisive role of material production in public life, the founders of scientific communism concluded that human society is developing according to a natural pattern, in the course of which one socioeconomic system is replaced by another. This conclusion was the philosophical proof of capitalism's inevitable transition to socialism.

One of the most important tenets in Marxist political economy was its economic substantiation of the inevitability of a revolutionary struggle and a victory for the working class over the bourgeoisie. K. Marx and F. Engels taught us that capitalistic collectivization of production occurs as capitalism develops, that the material prerequisites are prepared for a higher social order. Revealing the antagonistic contradiction between productive forces and production relations in the bourgeois society, between the public nature of production and private acquisition of the results of labor, they demonstrated that this contradiction develops into a deeply rooted conflict, the objective precondition for socialist revolution. The tenet that the capitalist production system will inevitably be replaced by a communist system as a result of a proletarian, socialist revolution is the basic conclusion coming out of the entire economic theory of Marxism.

Based on philosophical and economic substantiation of the inevitability of capitalism's downfall and the triumph of communism, K. Marx and F. Engels created scientific communism, the theory and program for the world proletariat's revolutionary movement. They saw in the working class that powerful social force with the purpose and the capability of destroying capitalist orders, of destroying all exploitation of man by man and building the communist society. The conclusion as to the worldwide historical mission of the proletariat as the grave-digger of capitalism and the creator of a new society was therefore the greatest scientific accomplishment of K. Marx and F. Engels and became the central element in the theory of Marxism.

Upon arriving at this conclusion K. Marx and F. Engels worked out the doctrine of the socialist revolution as the only possible means by which the working class can gain political power and create the conditions necessary for building the new society. After

studying the bourgeois-democratic revolutions of 1848-1849 the founders of scientific communism concluded that a revolutionary situation must develop in each specific capitalist nation as one of the most important conditions for the successful accomplishment of a revolution. They considered "general unrest among the people," "an outbreak of general dissatisfaction" and "inability on the part of the government to preserve the existing form of government" to be the determining indications of such a situation. K. Marx called this situation a "revolutionary crisis" (see K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch.," Vol. 7, p. 20).

It must then be pointed out that concepts pertaining to the dictatorship of the proletariat are of prominent importance in the theory of scientific communism. K. Marx and F. Engels demonstrated the fact that as it establishes its political supremacy, the working class must break up and crush the bourgeois state system and create a new system of power. This was the main conclusion in the Marxist doctrine on the state, and ignoring it, as experience has convinced us, causes the revolution to fail. After all, only a dictatorship of the proletariat is capable of accomplishing the historical task of expropriating the expropriators, suppressing the resistance of the overthrown exploitative classes, destroying everything which has preserved and secured private ownership, and organizing the building of a socialist society.

The instructor should then note that the development of the doctrine on the communist structure, on the main stages and patterns of its creation and development, was a great accomplishment of K. Marx and F. Engels. The founders of Marxism not only provided a general description of the new social order, but also formulated its basic law, which is essentially that the development of human resources becomes the "goal in itself" of the communist society (see K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch.," Vol. 25, Part II, p. 387). They demonstrated scientifically that the communist society passes through several stages in its development: the period of transition from capitalism to socialism; the first, or lower, phase--socialism; and the second, or higher, phase--communism itself.

As they worked out the doctrine on socialism and communism, K. Marx and F. Engels also established the fact that the proletariat has to create its own military organization, which will be the military expression of its emancipation. They assumed that after victory had been achieved for the socialist revolution, a coalition of bourgeois states might attack it. The proletarian state must therefore have a powerful military organization.

The founders of scientific communism considered that the working class must counter with international unity, international capital and attempts by the bourgeoisie of various nations to suppress the proletarian movement with a joint effort. "The experience of the past," K. Marx wrote in the "Founding Manifesto of International Comradeship of the Workers," "has shown that the punishment for disregarding the fraternal alliance which must exist among the workers of various nations and motivate them in their struggle for liberation to stand firmly behind each other is the general defeat of their separate efforts" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch.," Vol. 16, pp. 10-11).

In the theory of scientific communism exceptional importance is attached to the problem of preserving peace on earth and the interdependency between the proletariat's class struggle and the struggle against militarism, against unjust, usurping wars. K. Marx and F. Engels convincingly demonstrated the fact that militarism and these wars are in fundamental conflict with working-class interests and stressed the need for joint, vigorous efforts by the workers to protect peace.

Substantiating the worldwide historical mission of the proletariat, K. Marx and F. Engels pointed out the necessity of organizing it on a class basis. They considered a revolutionary party of the working class to be the highest form of such organization.

When he completes his presentation of the first topic the instructor should once more underscore the fact that K. Marx and F. Engels were not only geniuses as theoreticians of the workers' movement, but also great organizers of the revolutionary struggle by the proletariat and all the workers against capitalism. To them goes the historical credit for creating the first international communist organization, the Alliance of Communists, which became a school of indoctrination for proletarian revolutionaries and which history records as the beginning of the proletarian party.

The founding of the First International, International Brotherhood of Workers, in 1864 was an outstanding achievement in the revolutionary activities of the founders of scientific communism. The work of the First International became a landmark in the process of combining the theory of revolutionary Marxism with the workers' movement. It prepared the proletariat ideologically for the first attempt in human history to create a proletarian state, the Paris Commune, created in 1871.

K. Marx and F. Engels believed deeply in Russia's revolutionary possibilities. They carefully studied the social and economic situation and the distribution of class forces in the nation, and highly prized the works of Russian revolutionary democrats, particularly N.G. Chernyshevskiy and N.A. Dobrolyubov. Assessing prospects for the revolutionary movement in Russia, K. Marx wrote that this movement "must in the end, perhaps after a long and fierce struggle, inevitably lead to the creation of a Russian Commune" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch.," Vol. 19, p. 252). History has completely confirmed this scientific prediction. It was in our nation where the Great October Socialist Revolution was accomplished under the leadership of the Lenin Communist Party, which broke the chain of imperialism and made it possible to create a new, socialist society, which heralded the beginning of a new era for mankind--the era of elimination of all forms of exploitation, the era of victory for communism. It convincingly demonstrated the strength of Marxist-Leninist concepts and inspired the workers of all nations to struggle against all forms of oppression, both social and national.

2. Leninism-Marxism of the Contemporary Era

When he begins his presentation of the second topic the propagandist should remind the students that by the end of the 19th century world capitalism had entered its final, imperialist stage. The revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism had become a vital necessity of social development. By that time the center of the world revolutionary movement had shifted to Russia. A new period linked with the name of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, the period of Leninism, had begun in the history of Marxism. It should be explained that Leninism is Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, the era of the destruction of colonialism and of victory for national liberation movements, the era of man's transition from capitalism to socialism and the building of a communist society.

Leninism is truly international in nature. Attempts by our ideological enemies to depict this doctrine as something purely Russian and national are totally groundless. There is profound succession and inextricable linkage between the concepts and deeds of Marx and Engels and those of V.I. Lenin. The international nature of Leninism has

been demonstrated by many years of practical revolutionary movement by the working class of all nations, and not just of Russia, as the opponents of Marxism-Leninism attempt to demonstrate.

V.I. Lenin's outstanding service was primarily his development in the new historical conditions of a doctrine on imperialism. Vladimir Il'ich described imperialism as monopolistic capitalism, as its highest and final stage. V.I. Lenin regarded this as corrupt, moribund capitalism, the threshold of socialist revolution.

Supported by a scientific analysis of imperialism, V.I. Lenin added a number of new tenets to the Marxist theory of socialist revolution. For example, he demonstrated the fact that socialist revolution differs fundamentally from bourgeois revolution and constitutes a profound, radical change in all areas of public life.

V.I. Lenin made an important contribution to the theory of Marxism with his ideas on the worldwide, historical mission of the proletariat, the proletariat's hegemony in bourgeois-democratic and socialist revolutions, the distribution of class forces at various stages of the revolutionary struggle and the working-class alliances in this struggle. Vladimir Il'ich did a great deal to concretize the paths and forms of revolution and methods of struggle by the working class to establish their own political power.

After discovering the law of nonuniformity in the economic and political development of capitalism in the imperialist stage, V.I. Lenin advanced the concept that it would be possible for socialism to achieve a victory initially in a few nations or even a single, separate nation. He demonstrated scientifically that socialist revolution can only occur in a nation in which a revolutionary situation exists, and he formulated the main law of the revolution. In his work "'Left-Wing' Childishness in Communism" Vladimir Il'ich wrote: "The main law of revolution, which has been confirmed by all revolutions, particularly the three Russian revolutions occurring in the 20th century, is that to achieve a revolution it is not enough for the exploited and oppressed masses to recognize the impossibility of living in the old way and to demand changes; in order to have a revolution it must be impossible for the exploiters to live and rule in the old way. Only when the 'bottom levels' do not want the old way and the 'top levels' cannot function in the old way, only then can the revolution be victorious. This fact can also be expressed in the following words: A revolution is impossible without a general national crisis (affecting both the exploited and the exploiters)" ("Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol. 41, pp. 69-70).

Vladimir Il'ich considered the creation and reinforcement of a revolutionary party of the working class to be the factor determining the success of a socialist revolution. He saw in the proletarian party a powerful lever capable of "turning Russia around." After developing the orderly doctrine on the party, V.I. Lenin substantiated the concept of its leading role in the revolutionary workers' movement and formulated its organizational principles, standards governing its internal life and the basic principles underlying its policy in the building of socialism and communism.

V.I. Lenin actually incorporated his ideas on the Marxist party into the Communist Party which he created. The revolutionary-transformational role of Marxist-Leninist theory and its unity with revolutionary practices in the work of our party were brilliantly reflected in the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

Theoretical and practical questions pertaining to the building of socialism and prospects for developing the world revolutionary process assumed a central place in Leninism following the October victory. V.I. Lenin taught us that the state of dictatorship of the proletariat is the main tool for building socialism. This permits the working class, the workers, to counter the force of the bourgeoisie, their experience in governing, the private-ownership ideology and psychology with the force of proletarian conviction, awareness and discipline.

V.I. Lenin used the Paris Commune experience and that of the three Russian revolutions as the basis for developing and concretizing Marxist doctrine on the dictatorship of the proletariat, and thoroughly disclosed the historic importance of the Republic of Soviets as a new, socialist type of state immeasurably more democratic than any bourgeois, parliamentary republic. Vladimir Il'ich saw in the dictatorship of the proletariat a new form of alliance between the working class and other groups of workers in a relentless struggle against the forces and traditions of the old society, the main tool for building socialism.

It should be mentioned that V.I. Lenin never described the soviets as the absolute form of dictatorship of the proletariat. He more than once expressed the thought that the movement of peoples toward socialism cannot fail to produce an enormous abundance and diversity of political forms of state power of the workers, but their essence will be the same--dictatorship of the proletariat.

V.I. Lenin thoroughly developed the matter of the socialist state's destiny, its gradual development into communist, public self-government. The transition from a state of dictatorship of the proletariat into a national socialist state is an important stage in this process.

V.I. Lenin devoted especially great attention to the theoretical elaboration and the practical resolution of matters pertaining to the socialist homeland's defense, to the building of a military organization for the society. Any revolution, he taught us, is only worth something if it is able to defend itself. According to Vladimir Il'ich, if the working class wants to dominate and is to dominate, it must also demonstrate this with a military organization powerful enough to defend the conquests of socialism. Our valorous Armed Forces, created by the party led by V.I. Lenin, was precisely such an organization.

V.I. Lenin also made an enormous contribution to the theory of scientific communism with his elaboration of the most important problems pertaining to proletarian internationalism. V.I. Lenin applied its principles also to the proletariat's armed struggle in defense of the socialist homeland. He proved the international nature of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the need to indoctrinate the Soviet people and the fightingmen of our army and navy in a spirit of fervent patriotism, proletarian internationalism, friendship and brotherhood of peoples.

V.I. Lenin's further development of the doctrine on the period of transition from capitalism to socialism and on the new forms of class struggle by the proletariat in this phase, on socialism and communism as two phases of communist development, on the degrees of social maturity of the socialist society and the need for it to achieve a developed state is of worldwide historical importance.

Vladimir Il'ich not only scientifically demonstrated the possibility of developing full socialism in one nation, but also worked out a smoothly structured program for creating it in the USSR. Lenin's plan called for the nation's industrialization, the socialist restructuring of agriculture, the accomplishment of a cultural revolution and Marxist resolution of the national issue.

Socialism, V.I. Lenin taught us, can only be victorious when it is based on advanced, modern technology, a powerful socialist industry and a high level of labor productivity. He regarded the electrification of all branches of production as the foundation for the creation of the socialist society's productive forces. Lenin's ideas on socialist industrialization became the basis for creating the material and technological foundation for socialism in our nation and in the people's democratic nations, especially those in which the industrial base was inadequately developed in the past.

Relying on and further developing the agrarian theory of K. Marx and F. Engels, V.I. Lenin created a plan of genius for introducing the peasantry to socialism through cooperation. Cooperation, according to Vladimir Il'ich, is the form of comradesly association of the peasants' farms most accessible, understandable and advantageous to them. The voluntary uniting of peasants on collective farms, the elimination of kulaks--the last exploitative class--and the organization of sovkhozes heralded a fundamental social change in the life of our nation's peasantry and placed the rural area onto the socialist path of development. And so, the historical experience has totally confirmed the correctness of Lenin's principles for the socialist restructuring of agriculture. And wherever these principles are ignored or are not consistently applied, there may be preserved a base for antisocialist forces.

The plan substantiated by V.I. Lenin for socialist reforms in the area of culture is extremely important to socialist development theory and practice. Lenin's program of cultural revolution includes the improvement of public education; the creation of the conditions necessary for acquainting the popular masses with politics, with knowledge and the achievements of world science and culture, the development of a new intelligentsia truly of the people; the extensive dissemination of scientific socialist ideology, and organization of the people's spiritual life on the basis of its principles; the elimination of petit bourgeois views, morals and customs in the people's consciousness.

V.I. Lenin's genius gave the world the theoretical and practical solution to the national question. Self-determination and equality of nations, the uniting of workers of various nationalities in the struggle to build socialism, a close political, military and economic alliance of peoples who have set out on the socialist path, and the assurance of actual equality of nations with unrestrained development of their economies and cultures through joint efforts--these are the basic principles underlying Leninism's national program.

Our multinational socialist state--the USSR, a voluntary alliance of equal and sovereign republics--was created on the solid foundation of Lenin's concepts and under his leadership. The 60th anniversary of the USSR is graphic evidence of the triumph of Lenin's national policy principles. "Lenin's precepts, Lenin's national policy principles are sacred to us," Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stressed in the report "The 60th Anniversary of the USSR." "Relying upon them and consistently establishing them in our practices, we have created a

powerful state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the founding of which was not just an important step in the development of socialism but was also one of the extremely important turning points in the course of world history."

V.I. Lenin's theoretical and practical work and the Bolshevik party created by him contributed to the revolutionary indoctrination and unification of the international working class and to the formation of communist parties in other nations. According to V.I. Lenin Bolshevism created the ideological and tactical bases for the Third International, which was truly proletarian and communistic and which took into account both the accomplishments of the world era and the experience of the era of revolutions, which had begun ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol. 37, p. 304). The Third Communist International created in 1919 at V.I. Lenin's initiative and with his direct participation rallied the progressive, the most revolutionary elements of the working class of the entire world and contributed to all-round dissemination of the concepts of communism among the masses.

The Lenin phase in the development of the theory of scientific communism is continuing uninterruptedly in the theoretical work of the CPSU and fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties. Steadfastly following the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, the CPSU constantly concerns itself with the continued development of revolutionary theory, with its persistent and consistent implementation in the CPSU's practical work of directing the building of communism in our nation.

3. CPSU Policy--Marxism-Leninism in Action

The presentation of the third topic should begin with an explanation of the fact that the CPSU is guided by Marxism-Leninism in its work. Its policy conforms to the basic aspirations of the working class and all the working masses of our nation, since it correctly reflects requirements for the development of our material life, is based on a knowledge of the laws of progress and applies these in the interest of the entire society.

Party policy is broken down into foreign and domestic policy. It is divided up into economic, social, national, agrarian, military, cultural-ideological policy, and so forth, in conformity with the various areas of public life. The CPSU's successful guidance of the building of communism is achieved because of the organic combination of its Marxist-Leninist policy with proper organizational and ideological work among the masses. The party's domestic policy determines its foreign policy.

The CPSU is a party of scientific communism. It relies upon Marxist-Leninist doctrine for working out and defining foreign and domestic policy. The nature of the tasks facing our Soviet society, however, demands continued active elaboration of theoretical problems of social development and their consideration in the political work. "The Marxist-Leninist party," the 26th CPSU Congress pointed out, "cannot fulfill its role if it does not devote proper attention to the understanding of everything which is occurring, to the summarization of new developments in life and to the creative development of Marxist-Leninist theory" ("Materialy XXVI s'yezda KPSS" [26th CPSU Congress Materials], p. 77).

Just in recent years documents of the 23rd-25th party congresses, decisions coming out of CPSU Central Committee plenums, particularly the May and November plenums of 1982, and speeches by leaders of the party and the Soviet State have scientifically covered

the following urgent problems of modern times: the matter of describing the substance and the main contradiction of the modern era; the task of arriving at a conclusion on the intensification of capitalism's general crisis and describing the new phase of that crisis; the problem of revealing the patterns of the world revolutionary process and the place and role of each of the currents in it (the world system of socialism, the revolutionary movement of the working class in the capitalist nations, the national liberation movement and the democratic movements of the contemporary era); the matter of clarifying the political strategy and tactics of the world communist movement; the problem of elaborating the question of effecting a socialist revolution and ways of gaining political power in the contemporary situation; the matter of clarifying the situation with respect to the non-capitalistic path of development, the socialist orientation of a number of nations liberated from colonial dependency; the problem of developing conditions making possible the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems; the problem of developing, clarifying and detailing a Peace Program and a struggle for detente and elimination of the danger of a world thermonuclear war, and others.

The following main points have been added to Marxist-Leninist theory, based on the experience of building a new society in our nation and in the fraternal socialist states: formulation of the main patterns of socialist revolution and socialist development; development of the concept of the developed socialist society; the conclusion that the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat develops into a common nation state; the conclusion as to the complete, final and irreversible resolution of the national issue in the form in which we inherited it from the past; the points concerning the emergence of a new historical community of people, the Soviet people, in the USSR, the development of a culture of the Soviet people which is international in spirit and nature, and the common national pride of the Soviet people; the conclusion that the role of the working class increases during the period of developed socialism, that all classes and social groups in the Soviet society are steadily moving toward equalization, and that the classless structure of the society is mainly and basically formed within the historical framework of mature socialism; substantiation of the tenet pertaining to the CPSU's growing, guiding role in the building of communism; development of the substance of and ways to create the material and technological base for communism, and so forth.

Building its policy on the foundation of fundamental Marxist-Leninist principles and taking into account the new conclusions and theoretical generalizations, the CPSU is focusing all its efforts in two interrelated areas--the creation of communism and the strengthening of peace.

In the accomplishment of tasks involved in the building of communism, V.I. Lenin told us, for our party economic problems are the "most interesting policy" and are in the forefront of our work. Its scientifically based economic policy has been worked out in decisions of the 24th, 25th and 26th party congresses and plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, and a course has been taken toward the enhancement of production effectiveness and intensification.

The CPSU is taking all steps necessary to implement this policy. The November 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, for example, uncovered reserves in our economy, the application of which will have a significant effect with respect to further improving the national economy. As pointed out at the plenum, these include, in the first place, accelerated scientific and technological progress, the broad and rapid application in production of the achievements of science, technology and progressive experience;

in the second place, more efficient use of labor and materials; thirdly, the extensive dissemination of advance know-how; and fourthly, a determined campaign against mismanagement and waste.

At the center of the party's economic policy lies concern for the steady improvement of the people's material and cultural standard of living and for the creation of better conditions for the balanced development of the individual.

Occupying an important place in CPSU policy are matters pertaining to the continued development of the society's social and class structure and national relations under developed socialism, the strengthening of the material and spiritual bases for the socialist way of life, development of the new man, continued development of the Soviet political system and our socialist democracy, enhancement of the party's guiding role in public life and the improvement of party leadership methods.

In the spiritual and ideological area CPSU policy focuses on the continued development of public education, the improvement of training, labor and moral indoctrination and the ideological-esthetic level of works of literature and art, and the improvement of ideological, political and indoctrinational work.

One of the most important directions of CPSU policy involves the strengthening of peace, the expansion of detente and the curbing of the arms race. The Soviet Union is waging a determined struggle to halt the arms race and completely ban nuclear weapons. Implementing its policy of peace, our nation has produced many specific proposals on military detente in Europe and on the planet as a whole, and has unilaterally committed itself not to be the first to employ nuclear weapons. Comrade Yu.V. Andropov declared once again at the November 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee that Soviet foreign policy has been and remains that defined by decisions of the 24th, 25th and 26th congresses of our party. The accomplishment of a lasting peace and protection of peoples' rights to independence and social progress are unvarying goals of our foreign policy. Our party and state leadership will pursue these goals in a principled manner, consistently and deliberately.

The CPSU must take into account the drastically increased aggressive of imperialism, however, primarily American imperialism. As Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense, stated in an interview with a TASS correspondent, the aggressive intrigues of the USA and NATO are forcing us, along with the fraternal socialist nations, to concern ourselves seriously with maintaining our defense capability at the proper level.

Special stress should be laid on the fact that the Communist Party's leadership of the Armed Forces is a natural law and an extremely important principle of Soviet military organizational development. V.I. Lenin made a constant effort to see that all matters pertaining to the national defense were decided in precise accordance with party policy. Lenin's doctrine on the defense of the socialist homeland constitutes the foundation for the CPSU's work in the area of military organizational development and serves as a reliable guide with respect to further strengthening the nation's defense capability and enhancing the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Questions pertaining to the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces occupy a special place in the party's military policy. As the main indicator of the qualitative

state of the troops and naval forces it cannot be a temporary or seasonal thing and cannot be frozen at a certain level. It must be constantly raised and improved. The efforts of all personnel in the Armed Forces must focus on this.

As the presentation of the subject is completed it is important to stress once again the fact that the theory of scientific communism developed by K. Marx and F. Engels and creatively advanced in the new historical conditions by V.I. Lenin is the basis for all our party's work. The CPSU will continue to be undeviatingly guided in its policy by the concepts of Marxism-Leninism. It will do everything possible to further improve the national economy and the people's welfare, to strengthen our society's sociopolitical and ideological unity and the fraternal friendship of peoples of the USSR, to indoctrinate the Soviet people and fightingmen of the army and navy in a spirit of Marxism-Leninism, fervent love for the homeland and proletarian, socialist internationalism, and take the steps necessary to assure that the lovers of military adventures do not catch the Soviet Nation unprepared, that a potential aggressor understands that a devastating retaliatory strike inevitably awaits it.

To prepare for the seminar (discussion) on this subject the students must study the "Communist Party Manifesto" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch.," Vol. 4, pp. 423-442); V.I. Lenin's works "Three Sources and Three Components of Marxism" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol. 23, pp. 40-43), "K. Marx" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol. 26, pp. 46-51, 58-59, 73-77); "26th CPSU Congress Materials," pp. 26-30, 44-49; the speech delivered by Comrade Yu.V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the 22 November 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee (PRAVDA, 23 Nov. 82) and his report "The 60th Anniversary of the USSR" delivered at a joint, formal session of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet (PRAVDA, 22 Dec. 82).

In the evening it is useful for the students to view the films "The First Communist on the Planet," "Thinker and Revolutionary," "Lenin (the Final Pages)," "The Algebra of Revolution," "The Spring of Humanity" and "From Socialism to Communism."

The following topics should be discussed in the seminar (discussion): 1. What is the substance of Marxism's revolutionary theory? 2. What was V.I. Lenin's contribution to the further development of Marxist doctrine? 3. What is Leninism? 4. Why is the CPSU policy called Marxism-Leninism in action?

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ARMED FORCES

INFORMATION ON PARTY REGISTRATION AND DOCUMENTS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 2, Jan 83 (signed to press 3 Jan 83)
p 89

[Article: "On the Procedure for Registering Communists and Filling Out Party Documents"]

[Text] The editors receive letters from the readers requesting clarification of the procedure for registering communists and filling out party documents.

These questions are answered below.

1. How does a primary party organization maintain its registry of the communists?

In accordance with instructions issued by the CPSU Central Committee the registry of party members and candidate members is handled by the party organization secretaries. The registry is kept in the form of a list (Form No. 11) in the primary party organizations of regiments, ships and separate units, regardless of their numerical strength, while the registry of CPSU members and candidate members in primary party organizations of military educational institutions and installations with more than 50 communists can be maintained as a list or in the form of personal membership file cards. These cards are kept in alphabetical order, separately for party members and candidate members, for party organizations with the rank of primary organizations.

In party organizations equivalent to shop organizations the registry of CPSU members and candidate members is kept in the form of a list, the format being optional. Communists sent on assignments by the political section, involving temporary party registration there, are not entered on the list but are recorded separately. Personal membership file cards are not filled out for them.

2. What is the procedure for removing from the registry the names of communists leaving the party organization of one subunit for another within the same unit? In such a case how is the date computed for registering the communists on the list (Form No. 11)?

The names of communists leaving a party organization of one subunit for another within the same unit, in which there is a party committee and in which the subunit party organizations have the rank of primary organizations, are removed from the registry by the secretary of the subunit party organization with the party committee's authorization.

The date on which a name is entered on the registry must coincide with the date of the unit order transferring the communist to another subunit.

3. Is it necessary to inform the party committee (Form No. 4) when a communist is transferred to an equivalent position from one subunit with a party organization with the rank of a primary organization to another subunit, also with a party organization with the rank of a primary organization?

In this case notification need not be submitted to the party committee.

If, however, there has been a change in the communist's service status, his education, military and so forth, the party organization secretary is required to inform the party committee of the changes in his registry data.

4. What is entered in the column "Name of Primary Party Organization" when filling out the form for an individual becoming a CPSU member or candidate member, when the matter of his acceptance into the party is considered in a party organization with the rank of a primary organization?

When the matter of acceptance into the CPSU is being considered by a party organization with the rank of a primary organization this column is filled out in approximately the following manner: "Primary party organization of the 2nd Battalion of Military Unit 00000." The name of the political section of the formation, military district, group of forces or fleet of which the given unit is a part is then indicated.

If the political section is directly subordinate to the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy or the political directorate of the branch of the Armed Forces, then the information "Soviet Army (Navy)" is entered in the column.

5. Should the information "with the rank of primary organization" be entered following the name of the party organization in the text of personal references issued to communists and when filling out party administrative documents?

No, it should not. As explained above, the primary party organization is indicated as the "Primary party organization of the 2nd Battalion of Military Unit 00000" for filling out records for a person entering the CPSU and for writing up party references for communists, minutes of party meetings and other documents.

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GROUND FORCES

INDOCTRINATION OF WARTIME EXPERIENCE IN TANK UNIT

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 2, Jan 83 (signed to press 3 Jan 83)
pp 36-39

[Article by Lt Col P. Chernenko: "Traditions in the Formation"]

[Text] It was the second day of the tactical exercise. The tankmen had covered many dozens of kilometers as they performed the assigned missions. Operating jointly with motorized riflemen, they had twice carried out attacks against "enemy" strongpoints.

The rest was not a long one. At the first glimmer of dawn the concerned mechanics/drivers were at work on the combat vehicles, checking the running gear and engines over and over again. There was a difficult march ahead, involving the forcing of a water barrier, and the equipment had to be in a state of complete combat readiness.

Walking along the edge of the woods in which the vehicles were concealed, Lieutenant Colonel V. Derebyanko, deputy regimental commander for political affairs, was thinking about the fact that right now, as never before, he needed to say something kind and sincere to the men, to give them a feeling of courage and confidence in their own abilities. The previous evening, as he briefed the party and Komsomol activists and the agitators, he had advised them in their talks with the tankmen to tell the latter how on this very ground fierce battles had been waged for Stalingrad 40 years before, how Soviet fightingmen were marvels of bravery and heroism as they held back the enemy onslaught at the approaches to the city.

In a small clearing the officer saw a group of fightingmen listening attentively to Private I. Vlasov, secretary of a company Komsomol organization.

..."There were only four of them left, with two anti-tank guns," Vlasov went on with his story. "Junior Sergeant Petr Boloto, a communist, assumed command of the group. They dug in on one of those hills over there and held it, preventing the fascist tanks from getting through. The anti-tank gunners knocked out 15 enemy machines and although they were all wounded, they did not give up the position.... This is what it means to fulfill your duty as demanded by the oath and the homeland!"

The expressions on the soldiers' faces became stern. At that moment each of them was most likely imagining the flood of tanks rushing down upon the valorous fightingmen, one after another. Neither the hearts nor the hands of the fightingmen trembled, however. After all, behind them lay the Volga and Stalingrad, and they fought valorously for every inch of their native land, sparing neither their blood nor their very lives.

"Yes, comrades," Lieutenant Colonel V.Derevyanko joined in the conversation. "Every soldier was a hero on our Stalingrad land. The tankmen demonstrated heroism here on the approaches to the city on the Volga. Khasan Yambekov's tank crew, for example, engaged in battle with eight enemy tanks and knocked four of them out of action. But our "34" also caught on fire. Khasan Yambekov's crew members Andrey Tarabanov, Sergey Fedenko and Valiliy Mushilov, representing various nationalities of our homeland, fought to the end. Their feat at Stalingrad, like the feats performed by hundreds of thousands of Soviet people, brought closer the routing of the enemy on the Volga and our Victory. It is our sacred duty, comrades, to be worthy of the older generation's memory, to continue their traditions."

"We shall try," said one of the fightingmen.

The fightingmen were not saying much just then. Each of them was already mentally picturing the forthcoming "battle" and thinking about how he could perform his task and not let his comrades down.

Talks on the combat traditions, on the valor of the grandfathers and fathers who fought the fascists on the approaches to Stalingrad and in the city itself had also been held in the subunits previously. Special propagandists, agitators, party and Komsomol activists told about the feats performed by the frontline fighters, stressing the fact that they not only demonstrated patriotism and courage, but also the great skill and iron discipline of frontline soldiers.

Warrant Officer I. Nikitenko, Great Patriotic War veteran, for example, was telling the fightingmen about this very thing. He was a common soldier at the front. He fought the enemy courageously, boldly, and was awarded the medal "For Valor." Ivan Aleksandrovich has served more than a single decade in the Soviet Armed Forces. He serves as he fought, giving it his all. And the medal "For Combat Merit," received in peacetime, has been added to his combat awards. The veteran gave the soldiers and sergeants a great deal of good advice, the most important of which was to learn courage and steadfastness now, during the period of combat training, to master the equipment and weapons.

...The tactical exercise continued. There was a difficult march of many kilometers and a difficult training battle. Captain A. Dyatchin, Senior Lieutenant T. Usmanov, Junior Sergeant V. Babich, Privates S. Volkov, S. Korobko and K. Orudzhev and many other fightingmen demonstrated great skill. The fightingmen received an excellent evaluation for their performance of the combat mission in the exercise. This was yet another advance in their fulfillment of socialist commitments accepted for the year of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR. The success achieved on the field of combat glory was made up of the skill, initiative and steadfastness of soldiers of the 1980s. The sources of their fighting spirit, self-control and focus on victory, however, were from those distant '40s, the feats of their fathers and grandfathers who blocked the enemy's advance with their bodies at Stalingrad.

This is how the unit party and Komsomol activists publicized the combat traditions of our Armed Forces, increased the activeness of the fightingmen in the tactical exercise, mobilized them for the performance of the assigned missions, created a fighting spirit and helped them to achieve a victory. The Stalingrad heroes walked unseen into the training battle alongside the soldiers and sergeants. Their feats and their example inspired the personnel.

This is an account of only one event in the political and indoctrinational work performed in the tactical exercise. The same sort of thing could be seen in many military collectives, in various phases of the combat training, however.

Commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations devoted a great deal of attention to indoctrinating the fightingmen in the glorious combat traditions of our Armed Forces. This work has been stepped up markedly during the period of preparations for celebrating the 40th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad. Classes which are a part of the combat and political training, lectures, reports, talks, morning and evening discussions on special subjects, meetings with Heroes of the Soviet Union and Great Patriotic War veterans, films, discussions of books on military-patriotic subjects and other activities are used for propagandizing the combat traditions of the Stalingraders.

Lessons in courage conducted at the initiative of the party activists have now become traditional in the military unit in which Major V. Golovin is a member of the party bureau. They are frequently conducted right where the fighting occurred during the war. The unit fightingmen recently received some more dear guests, veterans of the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps, which had a prominent role in the achievement of the victory at Stalingrad. Colonel (Retired) D. Dobrushin, former corps commissar, Major General (Retired) P. Brikel', former commander of a cavalry division, Colonel (Retired) M. Visaitov, former commander of a cavalry regiment, and other veterans came to meet with the personnel. They told the fightingmen of the courage and heroism demonstrated by the fightingmen of their unit and of the unforgettable days of the Stalingrad Battle. The tankmen listened to the frontline fighters with bated breath. This lesson in courage left an indelible imprint on their hearts and minds.

A morning discussion devoted to Volgograd and titled "A City of Courage and Glory" also made a profound emotional impression on the fightingmen. Senior Lieutenant A. Butuzov, member of the unit Komsomol committee, library worker A. Grebneva and other fightingmen/activists took an active part with respect to organizing and conducting it. That morning the men heard an exciting account of the feats performed by the Stalingraders, who courageously defended the city from the enemy. Technical propaganda means were used. Loud-speakers set up in the club auditorium broadcast Sovinformbyuro [Soviet Information Bureau] and TASS reports on events near Stalingrad. The combat operations of that period and episodes from the city's heroic defense came to life on the screen. Then the screen went blank, and the fightingmen saw on the stage N. Kovalevskiy, V. Matveyev and other veterans who took part in those events. The fightingmen greeted them with friendly applause and presented the guests with live flowers. The veterans of the front added their memories to that which the fightingmen had heard and seen. The commanders, political workers and Komsomol activists then spoke, telling how the unit fightingmen today are continuing the traditions of the frontline fighters.

"Diaries of the Stalingrad Battle" are kept in many units and subunits. They describe all the important events of those historic days between July 1942 and January 1943. Commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol activists present information on the events. In the unit in which I began my account, for example, Majors S. Palaynitsa, A. Polikov and I. Lysak, members of the party bureau, Captain A. Stepenev, Senior Lieutenant K. Usmanov and Junior Sergeant V. Babich, members of the Komsomol committee, and other activists take an active part with respect to maintaining this diary.

This collective is standing combat watch in honor of the 40th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad. Having assumed this watch, the soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers and officers are competing for the title of best specialist in the unit, and the subunits are competing for the banner "To the Best Military Collective, Winner of the Socialist Competition in Honor of the 40th Anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad." When I was in the regiment the banner had been awarded to the tank company commanded by Captain A. Dvatchin. Private Kamal Orudzhev, mechanic/driver, Private Arkadiy Golovatenko, gunner, Private Sergey Volkov, driver, Junior Sergeant Aleksandr Yevdokimov, tank crew commander, and Junior Sergeant Kamil' Yusupov, repairmen, received certificates for best specialists in the unit. One could see the pride in the faces of the fightingmen and the care with which they accepted that simple-looking document, on the face of which shone the words "For Our Soviet Homeland!".

Readers' conferences and literary reviews are being conducted and special book exhibits are being held in many of the collectives today. Literary reviews on the subject "The Image of Soviet Fightingmen in Creative Literature" and "The Komsomol in the Battle of Stalingrad," a readers' conference on "The Soviet Army--an Army of Friendship and Fraternity of Peoples of the USSR" and a meeting with Hero of the Soviet Union writer V. Karpov have been conducted in recent months in the unit in which Soviet Army employee S. Kolomiyets is in charge of the library, for example.

Works depicting the noble image of the Soviet soldier and the grandeur of the feat accomplished by him have great indoctrinational value and are always in great demand among the fightingmen. We know that the frontline fighters kept good books with them even during the days of heaviest fighting. Many of the nation's museums have volumes of N. Ostrovskiy, D. Furmanov, M. Sholokhov and other Soviet writers and poets, pierced by bullets and fragments, alongside other relics of the battles. The books also fought.

Unequaled feats were performed on almost every meter of Stalingrad ground. Numerous obelisks and monuments built at those lines where the Soviet fighters fought to the death tell about them. Fightingmen of the 1980s go there today. They go there along with the frontline fighters, veterans of the Armed Forces. They go to honor the memory of the dead heroes.

Here we see a grave with an obelisk. Guards Captain Ruben Ibarruri, Hero of the Soviet Union and commander of a machine-gun company, Hero of the Soviet Union pilot V. Kamenshchikov and Captain Kh. Fattyakhutdinov, battery commander, posthumously awarded the Order of Lenin, are buried here. Fightingmen of the subunit commanded by Major S. Mel'nichuk stand with bowed heads at the obelisk, paying the sacred tribute of love and appreciation to the heroes.

Here stands the legendary Pavlov House. It was designated as a fortress on the map of General-Field Marshal Paulus. The house was defended by Russians, Ukrainians, a Georgian, an Uzbek, a Kazakh, a Tajik and a Tatar. Senior Warrant Officer A. Kovalev has brought the young soldiers here to tell them about the soldierly friendship, daring and courage which helped the fightingmen led by Sergeant Yakov Pavlov to withstand one onslaught after another by the enemy, to hold out and be victorious.

Nearby, on Sovetskaya Street, stand the ruins of a mill. The building with its black perforations, wrecked and scorched by fire, is mute testimony to the Soviet soldier's

unequaled heroism. A large group of people stand next to the mill. They include fightingmen of the artillery battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Fokin.

Mamayev Mound.... Workers and students, kolkhoz workers and school children, fightingmen of the Soviet Army come here in an endless stream. Young soldiers take the military oath here. Komsomol cards and authorizations for travel to Komsomol shock construction projects are presented to the fightingmen here.

Many party and Komsomol organizations make an effort to propagandize the heroic traditions at the immediate sites where the feats were performed, where monuments and obelisks have been set up to honor the courage and heroism of Soviet soldiers. By visiting these sites the fightingmen gain a deeper awareness of the price of the Victory and are imbued with a sense of great responsibility for the defense of their socialist homeland.

The political workers and party activists are guided in their work of propagandizing the combat traditions by V.I. Lenin's statement that the essence of the revolutionary and combat traditions lies in the creative perception of accumulated heroic experience. After all, the traditions give us not only insight into the past, but also show us how to take what is most valuable from the path we have traveled. The 6th All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations stressed the fact that for achieving our indoctrinational goals we should make more active use of the revolutionary, combat and labor traditions of the Communist Party and the Soviet people, the heroic achievements of the Armed Forces of the USSR, the examples of mass heroism set by Soviet fightingmen in the Great Patriotic War and their models of selfless performance of military duty since the war.

Our district has many units and subunits which brought glory to their fighting colors in the battle with the fascist invaders. Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment "X," on the personnel roster of which Hero of the Soviet Union, Guards Private I. Dubinin has been entered in perpetuity, has a good reputation. Year after year the regiment's fightingmen achieve good results in the combat and political training.

The combat traditions are honored as sacred in the regiment. During their first days in the service young soldiers in the regiment are acquainted with the unit's combat history. The commanders and political workers organize the propaganda of traditions in such a way, as M.I. Kalinin said, that upon arriving in the regiment every new recruit knows not only its number, but also its combat history, all of its heroes and combat decorations, all its victories in the competitions and maneuvers, so that he can take pride in his regiment and always defend its honor. Fightingmen newly arriving in the regiment are acquainted with its combat history, its heroes and its right-flank military performance. The warm and cordial reception produces in the young hearts a sense of pride in the unit in which they are to serve, increases their sense of responsibility for its good reputation and motivates them to preserve and add to the combat traditions of the older generations.

The increased complexity of the international situation, particularly the offensive against socialism launched by ruling circles in the USA and the unprecedented intensity of their military preparations, place great demands upon all the Soviet fightingmen. Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense, recently underscored

the following: "The aggressive intrigues of the USA and NATO are forcing us, together with the fraternal socialist nations, to concern ourselves seriously with maintaining our defense capability at the proper level."

Decisions coming out of the November 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee orient the Soviet fightingmen toward this goal. Responding to these decisions, the heirs to the combat glory of the Stalingraders are giving their all to the improvement of their military skills in the new training year and are working with redoubled vigor. Every soldier, sergeant, warrant officer and officer sees this as his contribution to the continuation of the traditions of Stalingrad's heroes, of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War.

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GROUND FORCES

SHORTCOMINGS OF PARTY WORK IN TANK UNIT

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 2, Jan 83 (signed to press 3 Jan 83)
pp 52-56

[Article by Maj Gen S. Tutushkin: "Everyone is Accountable for Discipline"]

[Text] Fightingmen of the unit in which Captain S. Volkov is one of the party committee members were performing a combat training task under adverse conditions. The tankmen completed a rapid march at night, in a pouring rain and over broken terrain, and arrived at the proper area precisely at the designated time. A battle followed. It was difficult, like any battle, even a training battle. The tankmen emerged victorious from the battle. Their good tactical-fire and technical training, good physical, moral and psychological conditioning helped them, of course. They were also aided by firm military discipline, performance efficiency, strict observance of the requirements contained in the regulations and manuals and the desire to carry out their order absolutely, precisely and on time.

Discipline is the foundation of combat readiness in the forces. Without firm discipline, as the 6th All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations noted, there is no combat readiness. Communists of the regimental party organization understand this well. They give the commander effective assistance with respect to maintaining strict regulation order. In this process they proceed from the premise that discipline is primarily a political and moral category. They therefore place the main stress on the ideological aspect of the military indoctrination of the personnel, on making the fightingmen profoundly aware of their responsibility for enhancing the unit's combat readiness.

The party organization to which we refer exerts an active influence upon the course of the combat and political training for the fightingmen, upon the strengthening of discipline and regulation order. This has been possible primarily because a climate of mutual demandingness and exactingness has been established in the party collective itself. All of the communists are exemplary, disciplined fightingmen. Their irreproachable service influences those around them, orients the personnel in the direction of serious, creative work and motivates them to make a significant contribution to the enhancement of combat readiness and the strengthening of organization and order.

I have visited this regiment more than once in the performance of my service duties, and each time I have been convinced that the party activists and all the communists

work hard here to see that firm regulation order is constantly maintained in the unit. What is more, they do not equate this order simply to order in the barracks and on the grounds of the military camp, but take into account the fact that it includes the exemplary performance of guard duty and internal service and precise organization of the combat and political training, operation and maintenance of the equipment, that it also demands correct interrelations among the servicemen and strict observance of daily schedule.

The party organization concerns itself with creating a climate of demandingness and intolerance of shortcomings in the collective. Those who permit deviations from the requirements set forth in military regulations and ignore violations of discipline are brought strictly to account. At one of the party meetings, for example, there was a candid discussion on the subject of increasing the communists' personal responsibility for good organization of the internal service. Major V. Isayev and Captain Yu. Misyura, CPSU members, were the object of serious criticism. They had not properly organized the preparation of the fightingmen to perform their service on the daily duty detail. Certain soldiers and sergeants had a poor understanding of the duties of personnel on the daily duty detail and therefore performed those duties poorly.

The party organization also accepted blame for this. It had not created a situation in which the party members and candidate members themselves felt a sense of responsibility for the organization of the internal service. They rarely presented lectures and reports explaining Lenin's precepts with respect to vigilance and the CPSU's demands of the Armed Forces or the complexity of the contemporary international situation. They did not always brief the Komsomol aktiv going on guard duty. Certain party members and candidate members were not always models in the performance of their service on the daily duty detail.

All of the communists discussed this in a self-critical manner at the meeting. A specific and earnest decision was adopted. By way of fulfilling the decision, for example, officers V. Yefimov, V. Shevchenko, P. Kuzemchak and V. Kornilov, CPSU members, conducted talks on the absolute observance and fulfillment of the demands contained in the military oath and regulations by every serviceman. Military legal personnel spoke in the subunits, explaining to the personnel the basic points of military laws defining accountability for military crimes. Talks on general military regulations were conducted at the initiative of the communists during the hours of mass political work. In addition, the party committee recommended that the subunit party organizations hear reports from Isayev and Misyura on what they had done personally to improve the organization of the troops' service and to strengthen military discipline in the subunits.

These and other steps helped bring about a situation in which the communists markedly increased their assistance to the commanders with respect to establishing regulation order and organizing the internal service. I witnessed the latter personally on a recent visit to the regiment. Exemplary order is being maintained in the barracks. One senses in all matters a climate of respect for regulations and absolute observance of the requirements contained therein. The subunit duty personnel and orderlies diligently perform their duties. The standing of guard duty has improved markedly.

The ideological conviction of the servicemen and a profound understanding of the vital necessity of maintaining the combat readiness of the Armed Forces at a constantly high level make up the foundation of firm discipline, as we know. Fulfilling recommendations

coming out of the 6th All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations with respect to stepping up the ideological and indoctrinational work, the communists in the regiment are explaining materials of the 26 CPSU Congress and the November 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and documents from the formal meeting in the Kremlin devoted to the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR, and explaining the complexity of the international situation and the reasons behind imperialism's increased aggressiveness. Party members and candidate members attempt to see that every fightingman has a solid understanding of Lenin's ideas on the defense of the socialist homeland and understand the role and importance of military discipline to the continued strengthening of combat readiness and the achievement of victory in modern combat.

The party committee and party bureau make an effort to see that the political training contributes to the development of discipline and performance efficiency in the fightingmen. One party committee meeting, for example, discussed how the communists help to strengthen discipline by means of ideological-indoctrinational work. The party activists were troubled, for one thing, by the fact that in the political classes conducted in the subunit in which officer A. Romanenko, CPSU member, serves the study of Soviet laws and the demands set forth in the oath and regulations with respect to the necessity of strengthening discipline as the foundation of combat readiness was not closely linked to the life of the collective, to the work and concerns of the people, to their tasks. Certain comrades had withdrawn themselves from the ideological-indoctrinational work, citing lack of time as justification for separating themselves from the personnel. And the party organization did not correct these comrades.

The party committee made a study of the causes of the shortcomings, assessed them from a standpoint of principle and outlined steps to eliminate them. Among other things, the party committee members advised the communists in charge of the political study groups to take a look at the experience of the best propagandists and adopt their work techniques and methods. The best-trained officers were called upon to conduct political classes on military indoctrination subjects. Their open lessons provided a good school of methodological skill for all the supernumerary propagandists. Most importantly, however, the party committee increased its demandingness of every communist, not only as an official responsible for a specific section of the work but also as an indoctrinator. And this was the correct thing to do, because we cannot accept the attitude in an individual that he is responsible only for the equipment or, let us say, for the material support of the training process. No, every party member and candidate member is required to be an indoctrinator of the fightingmen, to serve, as pointed out in the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On the Further Improvement of Ideological Political and Indoctrinational Work," as the propagandist and agent of the Lenin party's ideas, to devote all his knowledge and all his spiritual strength to this exceptionally important work.

The kind of work performed in this area by the officers, who, one might say, form the backbone of the unit party organization, determines to a decisive degree whether there is firm military discipline and order in the subunits, in the regiment. The party committee considers its prime task to be that of developing in them the qualities of indoctrinators and champions of firm military discipline. The lieutenants, recent school graduates, especially need constant help and support. Upon arriving in the unit they are acquainted with the collective's traditions. The commander, political worker, party committee members and Komsomol activists talk with the young officers about ways to achieve success in the service, in the strengthening of discipline, and warn them about

possible errors. At the same time they find out how thoroughly the school graduate understands the duties of his position as prescribed by regulations and the requirements contained in other guiding documents with respect to maintaining firm military discipline.

It has become a good tradition in the regiment for the lieutenants to take their first steps under the close observation of the veteran communists, who teach the young officers the art of indoctrinating subordinates and advise them what to do in this or that difficult situation. The lieutenants are drawn into active participation in scientific and practical conferences, which discuss problems pertaining to the political, military, moral and legal indoctrination of the servicemen, and seminars are conducted for them on various aspects of pedagogics and psychology. One of the seminars discussed the indoctrinational work experience of Senior Lieutenant A. Savel'yev, a communist. This officer knows his men well, knows their personal qualities and inclinations and the strong and weak sides of their character. He constantly checks on the moods of the personnel, relies upon the sergeants and Komsomol activists for help, teaches them how to conduct the individual work with the personnel and regularly conducts critiques of the practices used for indoctrinating the soldiers.

The party activists draw the attention of company and platoon commanders to the importance of enhancing the authority of the sergeants and increasing their role in the indoctrinational process. Through inexperience some of the young officers have taken over for the sergeants.

This sort of situation developed in the subunit in which Senior Lieutenant S. Bozhkov, a communist, serves. At one time the officers in the subunit relaxed their efforts in the work performed with the section commanders. They did not attach proper importance to the improvement of the latter's professional skills, to developing pedagogical skills in them and assuring that they set a good personal example with respect to observing regulation order. Upon sensing that less was being demanded of them, some of the sergeants began to violate discipline themselves. Senior Sergeant V. Makarchuk, for example, left the unit without authorization. He invited Private N. Smoshchuk, a subordinate, to accompany him.

Personnel in the subunit could not understand how such a thing could happen. They began to delve into the matter. It became clear the infraction of military discipline committed by Makarchuk and Smoshchuk could not be regarded simply as a chance occurrence. Adequate attention was not being given to the training and indoctrination of the sergeants in the subunit. Certain officers-and-communists had separated themselves from the personnel and were not conducting individual work with them. In addition, there was no objective information on the soldiers' life in the barracks. The moral aspect of the fightingmen's training and service, the way they observed the requirements contained in the regulations, were not taken into account when the socialist competition results were totaled in the subunit. The indoctrinational work performed by the platoon and section commanders was assessed in a one-sided manner. The main criterion for measuring the demandingness of the officers was the number of penalties imposed. At the same time there was an attitude that where there were penalties it meant that military discipline was "not up to par," that the commander was not working satisfactorily. And some officers did not penalize those who deviated from the requirements contained in the regulations, ignored so-called "petty" infractions and did not give them publicity. A false picture of well-being thus developed....

The communists had to work hard to rectify the situation in the collective. The battalion party organization became more demanding of the party members and candidate members with respect to their work with the sergeants. Reports were heard from the communists in command of companies. Party committee members prepared special reports on the communists living in the barracks--outstanding sergeants Sh. Keremkhanov, N. Golomshe and Yu. Kravchuk, who skilfully indoctrinate their subordinates and actively influence the fightingmen with their words and deeds, instilling firm discipline and regulation order. As a result the work performed with the junior commanders improved markedly.

We know that the warrant officers have a large role in the training and indoctrination of the personnel. Warrant Officers I. Pritykin, I. Dobryakov, V. Ob"yezdov and others have proved themselves to be real champions of firm regulation order. They have made an important contribution to the struggle for military order. This is what makes one wonder, however: In the same regiment there are warrant officers--and--communists who deserve serious criticism. Take Warrant Officers B. Skuratovich and V. Martynov, for example. They cannot boast about the example they set, and certainly not about their successes in the indoctrinational work. Why does this occur? Why do some comrades conscientiously fulfill their party and service duties, while others fail to set an example in the training and service, remain uninvolved, as it were, in the collective's important affairs? There are numerous reasons. Mainly, however, it is the fact that demandingness has been relaxed in the party organizations where these communists are registered. No one really brought either Skuratovich or Martynov to account for their personal conduct. No one demanded that the comrades be kind and set an example of performance efficiency and discipline. One is struck by the fact that this demandingness, as we can see, is lacking, first of all, at the lower party level, there where they know the communists and their deficiencies in the service best of all. And after all, the opinion of the party group and the company party organization has an effective influence on the individual.

Personnel in the unit understand that campaign-like efforts cannot be tolerated in the work of establishing regulation order. The battalion party bureau headed by Captain K. Shelepov, for example, devotes constant attention to the strengthening of military discipline. The communists there regularly present lectures and reports, conduct talks on the subjects "The Military Oath--the Soviet Fightingman's Sacred Vow of Loyalty to the Homeland," "Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR--an Absolute Law of Life for the Fightingmen" and "Discipline--the Foundation of Combat Readiness," and initiate Lenin readings, question-and-answer evenings, readers' conferences and debates. The communists take advantage of every opportunity to develop in the servicemen a sense of friendship, collectivism and comradely mutual assistance. Mornings of discussion on special subjects, special republic days, filmed lectures and evenings honoring those out front in the socialist competition--fightingmen of various nations and ethnic groups of our country--all of this is aimed at developing in the soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers and officers a sense of great responsibility for the fulfillment of service duty, at creating in the collective a wholesome moral climate, a situation in which there is not place for even the slightest deviations from the demands contained in the military regulations.

The communists' contribution to the strengthening of discipline is studied in detail at meetings, when their reports are heard. CPSU members and candidate members assess each other's work with respect to establishing strict regulation order in a demanding and principled manner.

Unfortunately, however, this kind of demanding atmosphere has not been established in all the unit's party organizations. Communists guilty of violating regulation order are not always brought to strict account as specified in the CPSU Charter. Reports from CPSU members and candidate members on their participation in the political and indoctrinational work and on their personal contribution to the enhancement of organization are sometimes prepared and heard only as a formality. This criticism can apply against the party bureau in which officer B. Zholnerchuk is secretary, among others. The communists there were given literally a single day to prepare their reports for discussion at a meeting of the party bureau. The measure was carried only for the sake of a "checkmark" in the record. The reports were not accompanied by an in-depth study of the state of discipline in the subunit in which the communist serves, the causes of shortcomings or the specific assistance given the commander by the specific comrade with respect to establishing regulation order. The comrades were therefore given recommendations of a general order, so to speak, suitable for any event in life.

During the report-and-election party meetings and during the discussion of the results of the past training year, measures designed to continue maintaining firm regulation order were specified in each party collective. The communists outlined ways to resolve many problems pertaining to the steady enhancement of quality and effectiveness in the political, military, moral and legal indoctrination and in the individual work performed with the servicemen. It is now a matter of lively organizational work to fulfill the decisions adopted, of increasing the role of the party collectives, of each party member and candidate member, in the struggle for firm military discipline and assuring that all the communists and Komsomol members set a good example in the training and the service.

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STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES

WORK OF PARTY COMMISSION IN SRF DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 2, Jan 83 (signed to press 3 Jan 83)
pp 57-62

[Article by Maj Gen N. Shlikhunov, secretary of the party commission in the Political Directorate of the Strategic Rocket Forces: "Developing a Sense of Party Duty"]

[Text] The title of Lenin party member carries great honor, and great responsibility is involved in being one of its numbers, in the front ranks of the builders of communism. After all, the Communist Party, as V.I. Lenin graphically expressed it, is the brain, the honor and the conscience of our era. It is a combat alliance of fighters of a common mind and common action. And the more active its members are, the greater their organization and discipline, the more strictly they observe Leninist standards of party life and the principles of party leadership and implement the CPSU Program and Charter, the more strongly developed their sense of great responsibility for the state of affairs throughout the party and within their assigned section of the work, the more solid, united and fit for action will be this alliance.

Decisions of CPSU congresses and other documents are imbued with concern for enhancing the avant-garde role of the communists. The 6th All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations pointed out the need to assure that the party members and candidate members set a good personal example, to indoctrinate them as political fighters and develop good efficiency and moral qualities in them. "The key to increasing party influence with respect to the accomplishment of tasks involved in the training of the troops and fleets," Army General A.A. Yepishev, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, underscored in the report at the conference, "is to assure that each party member takes an avant-garde role."

In the past training year many units and subunits of the Strategic Rocket Forces became excellent ones. They successfully accomplished the combat training missions and totally fulfilled their socialist commitments accepted in honor of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR. And the communists were the leaders in all these good achievements. As they always have, they inspired their colleagues with their passionate party work and personal example, organized them and led them toward the pinnacles of combat skill. They are guided by a sense of great responsibility for the improvement of combat readiness in their units and subunits, quality fulfillment of the combat and political training plans and the strengthening of military discipline. The party commissions in the political organs of the rocket forces play a large role in the development of this sense of responsibility in the party members

and candidate members. In addition to considering individuals for acceptance into the party and cases of infractions by the communists, they check on how the party members and candidate members are fulfilling the CPSU Charter and whether they are observing party, state and military discipline, and strive persistently in all their activities to increase the communists' sense of responsibility for implementing party policy.

The inspections, in which the party commission members are assigned to participate by the political organs, are distinguished by thoroughness, objectivity and principle. They make it possible for the commanders, political organs and party organizations to form a more complete picture of how decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, decrees passed by the CPSU Central Committee and the requirements set forth in the CPSU Charter are being fulfilled, and contribute to the creation of a climate of demandingness and principle in the party collectives.

I shall cite a specific example. The party commission in which officer I. Pechenin is secretary keeps the focus of attention on the observance of the CPSU Charter's requirements by the communists, on increasing the avant-garde role of the members and candidate members and instilling in them a sense of responsibility for the assigned section of the work. The commission members participate in checks conducted by the political section on the fulfillment of party decisions and in the study of indoctrination of the communists and the state of party discipline. The party organizations are informed of the political section's conclusions. At the meetings members of the party commission inform the communists of the results of their work and make recommendations for improving the indoctrination of party members and candidate members. They also regularly conduct talks on the CPSU Program and the requirements set forth in the CPSU Charter and in the Instructions to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy.

The party commission not only reveals cases of inadequate responsibility on the part of the communists and unconscientious fulfillment of their party and service duties, but also thoroughly studies the causes of existing shortcomings and helps the party organizations to take a broader view of the substance and methods of their work, to derive the proper conclusions and generalizations from the study of the collective's intra-party life. As an example, the political section became aware of serious deficiencies in the work performed by the communists to strengthen military discipline. What was the matter? Why was the party bureau, in which officer A. Stepanko is a member, tolerating the situation?

Party commission members made a visit there, talked with the communists and learned that certain party members and candidate members were doing little to establish strict regulation order and were ignoring deviations from the demands contained in the military regulations. The party organization had relaxed its individual indoctrinational work with the personnel and its demandingness of the communists, and was not bringing to account those who were not setting an example in their personal conduct and not taking part in the public life.

The results of the inspection were discussed at a party bureau meeting. The secretary of the party commission made a report. He thoroughly discussed the way in which a party organization helps a commander to strengthen military discipline and concerns itself with assuring that the communists take an avant-garde role in the combat training and with the creation of a climate of nonacceptance of shortcomings in the collective. He reminded the personnel that every party member and candidate member is

required to know and absolutely observe Soviet laws and military regulations, to set an example in the fulfillment of his military duty and actively combat manifestations of laxity and complacency. The party organization, the report points out, had not achieved this. Certain communists (who were named) had failings in their service performance and demonstrated a lack of efficiency, and this could not fail to weaken the party's influence upon the personnel.

The pointed and specific nature of the issues raised contributed to an earnest discussion based on principle. The party activists clearly saw the causes of the shortcomings in their work aimed at strengthening military discipline and their own omissions, and outlined ways to remedy the shortcomings. The party commission members took an active part in the realization of these measures. They helped the party bureau to prepare and conduct a party meeting on the subject "The Communist--a Champion of Discipline" and conducted individual talks with the communists whose conduct had been criticized. All of this produced results. Demandingness of party members and candidate members was increased in the party organization, and the party bureau became more strictly demanding of them with respect to the strengthening of military discipline and the fulfillment of regulations, orders and directives.

We know how important party meetings are for developing in the communists a sense of great responsibility for the irreproachable fulfillment of party and service duties. The discussion in the party organizations of matters pertaining to the improvement of the combat and political training and the indoctrination of the fightingmen, a discussion based on principle, helps to summarize progressive experience, to reveal errors in the work of both individual communists and the party organization as a whole, and to take prompt measures to improve the situation. As they carry out assignments from the political section the members of the party commissions therefore find out how the principles of intra-party democracy are being observed during the collective discussion, how criticism and self-criticism are developed. For example, party commission members have recently taken part in meetings at which the following topics were discussed: "The CPSU Charter--the Law Governing Party Life," "V.I. Lenin on Membership in the Party," "Value the Great Title of a Communist" and "Your Contribution to the Fulfillment of Party Decisions." The party commission members helped the party organization secretaries to prepare for the meetings. The meetings were lively and helped to raise the communists' sense of responsibility for the absolute fulfillment of the CPSU Charter.

We can see from the situation that the party commissions are doing a great deal to improve the state of criticism and self-criticism in the party organizations. They have begun reacting more promptly and efficiently to indications of incorrect behavior on the part of individual communists and to the suppressing of criticism, regarding such actions as gross violations of the standards of intra-party life and the CPSU Charter. Officer Sh. Burumkulov, a party member, for example, rejected even the slightest critical comments directed toward him, was rude to those around him and was not conscientious in the fulfillment of his duties as a member of the party bureau. The secretary of the party organization attempted to influence him, reminded him of his party duty, pointed out the communist's errors and advised him to change the way he handled people. Burumkulov received the secretary's just criticism in a strange way. He seemed to agree, but in fact he derived no conclusions for himself from the comments. He attempted to pressure the communists during the elections to the party bureau. For his improper attitude toward criticism and his harassment of people for criticizing him the party commission issued CPSU member Burumkulov a strict reprimand, which was entered in his record.

I would also like to mention the following. We sometimes encounter cases in which some communists, giving in to a feeling of false comradeship, attempt to play down the severity of the matter or to keep silent when infractions are discussed. This is neither comradely nor true to the party. And sometimes communists criticizing certain negative developments do not receive support from the leaders of the party organizations. Sometimes they give verbal support to a CPSU member or candidate member speaking out against shortcomings, even thank him and promise to do everything possible to correct the errors. Time passes, but the situation remains the same. And the communists who criticized the situation begins to wonder: "Is it worth speaking out again at a meeting, if everything stays the same"? I believe that this makes the communists passive and discourages them from speaking out. The secretary of the party organization and other activists know when a person is not speaking out at a meeting, but they do not always think about why this is happening. Such matters should be thoroughly studied. Those political organs are doing the right thing, which have been involving members of the party commission more frequently in this work.

Our own experience has convinced us that it is not especially difficult to detect and identify errors, to determine who is to blame for the situation. It is more difficult to spot a shortcoming at its inception, to prevent it from developing. This is exactly why we attach great importance to matters of preventing violations of party and military discipline. Members of the party commissions have begun visiting the party organizations more frequently. They inquire about the state of affairs on the spot and conduct individual talks with the communists, primarily with those who deviate from the requirements set forth in the CPSU Charter and have been criticized for their service performance.

We also make extensive use of this method of work before the party members and candidate members go on combat alert, before exercises and periodic technical servicing operations and prior to complicated combat training missions. Life has shown us that the communists with whom we conduct such talks ordinarily derive the necessary conclusions for themselves, begin doing their job more vigorously and with a greater sense of responsibility and correct the shortcomings pointed out to them more rapidly. Following is one example. Officer V. Tormozov, candidate member of the CPSU, set an example in all things, in the combat training and in his conduct, and took an active part in the subunit's public life. It was noted, however, that for some time he had not been assessing his own actions self-critically. As a result he began to manifest a lack of discipline and negligence in the service. The communist's infractions did not escape the attention of officer E. Pashkovskiy, a member of the party commission. He talked with Tormozov about the CPSU Charter and reminded the young comrade of his party duty. Pashkovskiy also talked with members of the party bureau and recommended that they hear a report from Tormozov about how he was performing during his probationary period as a candidate member.

Later, Pashkovskiy enquired about Tormozov's service and gave him some useful recommendations. The party organization became more demanding of Tormozov and of the other party candidate members. As a result the officer began to assess his own behavior self-critically and to serve without incurring criticism. A shortcoming was thus nipped in the bud.

Unfortunately, some party organizations do not always react promptly to insignificant infractions or do not even notice them at all. They sometimes only begin discussing the shortcomings and errors after a gross infraction has been committed. In such cases they frequently resort to strict punishment, even to the point of expelling the individual from the party. An why not? After all, an individual who damages this title cannot be a communist. However, it is valid to ask why the individual was not brought to

strict account previously in the party organization, why measures of party indoctrination and influence such as comradely criticism or the issuing of a party reprimand, a warning or a recommendation, measures specified in the CPSU Charter, were not applied.

Permit me to cite an example which demonstrated what results from a low level of demand- ingness, from the absence of constant monitoring of the fulfillment of requirements set forth in the CPSU Charter by the communists. The party commission in the political directorate of the rocket forces recently received an appeal from officer Yu. Shcherbakov regarding his expulsion from the CPSU.

We carefully studied all of the material, checked out the facts and became convinced that Shcherbakov had been negligent with respect to the performance of his service duties, had violated military discipline, conducted himself improperly in the collective, exhibited arrogance and become greedy. After carefully weighing all the circumstances in the case, the party commission agreed with the decision previously adopted in the case.

It became even more apparent that the individual had not begun digressing all of a sudden and not by accident. This had been noticed in the party organization. The members were not especially concerned, however. Some of them even supported Shcherbakov. He was a good and energetic officer, they reasoned. In this situation of complacency, lack of principle and all-forgiveness the individual completely lost his sense of modesty and forgot about party duty and responsibility. His expulsion from the CPSU was Shcherbakov's first and final party penalty.

When one studies the reasons behind these personal cases, one concludes that those who receive party penalties are most frequently individuals with poor ideological conditioning, with poor political and moral qualities. One learns from talking to such an individual that he is little interested in matters of policy, that he has removed himself from the public life and the ideological and indoctrinational work, that he has locked himself into a little world of narrow, egotistical interests, is concerned only about his own welfare and contentment and has forgotten about the great obligations of a party member.

A party organization cannot remain passive with respect to comrades whose ideological growth has been arrested. A high level of ideological conviction in a communist is the crucial condition for his selfless loyalty to the cause of the CPSU and his ir- reproachable fulfillment of party and service duty. The primary party organizations are expected to concern themselves constantly with improving the political knowledge of CPSU members and candidate members to assure that they take a leading role in the daily life, the training and public affairs. This was especially stressed at the 6th All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations.

Members of the party commissions, along with other political organ workers, frequently need to thoroughly acquaint themselves with the productive work performed by party organizations in the ideological conditioning of the communists, experience which deserves every kind of attention and naturally, summarization. In the party collective in which Captain Yu. Akuz, a participant in the 6th All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations, is secretary, all of the communists regularly study Lenin's ideological heritage and decisions of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government. Matters pertaining to the political training of CPSU members and candidate

members are periodically considered at party meetings and sessions of the party bureau. Lectures, reports, talks and consultations are organized to help those studying Marxist-Leninist theory. Theoretical discussions and seminars are conducted. Mutual assistance has been organized in the political self-education. The bureau members give special attention to the young communists, teach them to work on their own with original sources. Comrades recently accepted into the party study V.I. Lenin's biography and his works, decisions of the 26th party congress, decrees passed by the CPSU Central Committee and materials from the May and November 1982 Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee and the joint, formal meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Concerning themselves tirelessly with the growth of the communists' political and practical activeness, many party organizations have begun studying more thoroughly their attitude toward the service and toward public work. Individual talks with the communists and the hearing of reports by them have become a solidly established practice. All of this is helping to develop in the party members and candidate members, principle, demandingness of each other and a sense of responsibility for the irreproachable fulfillment of party and service duty.

Workers with the political organs and members of the party commissions attempt to make the experience of these party organizations available to the general party aktiv. Not just seminars and assemblies, but also individual talks with the people, are used for this purpose.

The role of party organizations and party commissions in the selection of aware, active fightingmen, the very best, for party membership is worth mentioning. The fact is that we have still not eliminated all of the cases by far, in which, due to a lack of proper selection for membership in the CPSU, certain of the newly accepted comrades are not fully prepared to carry the great title of a communist.

The vast majority of those entering the party ranks justify the trust given to them, of course. The careful selection of party members is most important. After that, there must be ideological and indoctrinational work with the new members. The party commissions take part in this work. We constantly remind the party aktiv that an individual's ideological-political and moral indoctrination does not end with his acceptance into the CPSU ranks. It is only beginning, but it is now on a qualitatively different level. The communist now acquires experience, but the party organization is expected to continue working on his indoctrination.

I would especially like to stress the importance of publicity in the work of the party commissions. We try to see that the communists are always thoroughly briefed on the results of our inspection and on the steps taken. Various means are used for this. Secretaries and members of the party commissions address meetings, seminars and conferences of the aktiv and the primary party organizations. We believe that it is useful to periodically send to the lower-level political organs and to the primary party organizations surveys of the work of the party commissions, their review of the cases of individuals being considered for acceptance as new comrades in the CPSU and their investigation of infractions by the communists. For example, the political directorate of the rocket forces has prepared and sent to the forces surveys on the work of party commissions with communists receiving party penalties, on the growth of CPSU

ranks and the indoctrination of CPSU candidate members, and on the enhancement of the communists' responsibility for the good mastery of the complex equipment.

Last year's results showed us that there has been a marked increase in the responsibility of party members and candidate members for their assigned sections and for the state of affairs in the collectives, that they are being more demanding of themselves and of those around them. The party commissions attempt to reinforce that which has been achieved. They develop in the communists good party qualities and direct them, as the November 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee instructed us, to combat violations of party discipline. We see this as a guarantee that the tasks facing the party organizations of units in the Strategic Rocket Forces will be successfully accomplished.

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DOSAAB AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

PERSONNEL, OTHER PROBLEMS IN MILITARY COMMISSARIATS DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 2, Jan 83 (signed to press 3 Jan 83)
pp 63-67

[Article by Maj A. Golda: "Above All Else--the Interests of the Cause" (follow-up on unpublished letters)]

[Text] There was alarm in every line of this letter. It told about shortcomings in the work of one of the rayon military commissariats. The author reported that standards of party life were being violated in the military commissariat's party organization and named those guilty of deviations from the requirements set forth in the CPSU Charter. He complained that criticism gets a hostile reception there, that people are harassed for it. At the end, as though, a cry from the heart, he wrote: "Please protect me against despotism. I fought against shortcomings until recently, and I had the understanding of certain comrades. Now I am actually isolated from the collective. And my treatment has turned into persecution...."

Upon arriving in the military commissariat I became acquainted with Captain I. Il'yenko, author of the letter. Ivan Fedorovich has served a long time in the army. He began his service career almost 20 years ago. He began as a conscript and then became a regular serviceman. Later, through home studies, he passed the entrance exams for a school, and his career as an officer began. He commanded a platoon and a company. After a time he was promoted. Everything went extremely well. He was praised and was singled out more than once for his diligence.

I leafed through the newspaper clippings which Ivan Fedorovich saves. Here I saw an article on outstanding platoon commander Il'yenko. Here was a newspaper photograph showing communist Il'yenko talking with the fightingmen. And there were many certificates. It is pleasant to contemplate such a past, of course.

We then switched the conversation to the present, and it is as though a cloud has come over the eyes of Ivan Fedorovich. His service in this military commissariat has not worked out. Why not? It is not easy to answer this question. Ivan Fedorovich is firmly convinced of one thing, however--that it is not his fault. It is all due to the fact, Il'yenko believes, that from the very beginning people were biased against him. He began working at the new job and noticed many irregularities in the organization of duty, the keeping of records, the maintenance of weapons and equipment. He also noticed that some officers deviate from the requirements contained in the general

regulations. When he encountered something negative, he did not remain silent. He criticized shortcomings and those for to blame for them. And Ivan Fedorovich believes that he paid for this. Everyone began looking askance at him.

"But was I not right in raising the issues"? And to confirm that he was, he tells the following. He was appointed chief of an assembly point. He went to work with enthusiasm, but he discovered that many things were lacking. He made up a list of equipment necessary to outfit the assembly point and went to see the military commissar. The latter approved the list and said that the equipment would have to be acquired. And where was it to be acquired? He would have to go all over the place and find it. He had enough concerns without that, though. "When I have the equipment I will set up the assembly point. I said so frankly, and even at a party meeting. I got no result, however, nobody did anything about it...."

According to Ivan Fedorovich, there were also no steps taken to establish a spirit of intolerance of shortcomings in the military commissariat's party organization. And the reason--"lack of principle on the part of the communists, who frequently pass over derelictions and do not assess them from the party standpoint." Il'yenko believes that this is precisely why certain comrades violate military discipline and commit immoral acts. He spoke out against the violators of discipline, but he received no support. Furthermore, according to Il'yenko, he began to be harassed for his criticism. Every pretext was used for settling the score with him, and his every blunder was emphasized. And until recently he had coped with the work in the section assigned to him. In any case there had been no special complaints against him. "Well, the cause has always been uppermost for me," Il'yenko stressed in our talk.

But the communists must place the interests of the cause above everything else, after all. They must. And yet, does everyone of them do this? Including Ivan Fedorovich himself? I talked with his colleagues. What was their opinion of what Il'yenko had written to the editors? I asked many of them this question, and I had the opportunity to talk with many of them. The real picture of the state of affairs gradually began to emerge.

The people recalled how 4 years previously Captain Il'yenko had arrived in the military commissariat to continue his military service. They remembered how he set enthusiastically about the difficult and important job entrusted to him. Ivan Fedorovich lacked experience, of course, but he had energy and industry in abundance. He gradually settled into the job. Naturally, the communists in the military commissariat and other colleagues were not indifferent as to how well their new comrade learned to handle the section assigned to him. They frequently gave him advice with respect to organizing the job better. Il'yenko received an especially large amount of assistance from reserve officer A. Savonin, CPSU member, who had worked in the military commissariat more than a quarter of a century. He sometimes even took on himself part of the difficulties which Ivan Fedorovich encountered on the new job.

He made some errors, but his senior comrades were understanding with him. They tactfully straightened him out and helped him with their words and their deeds. Sometime later, at one of the party meetings, communist Il'yenko reported on how he was fulfilling the CPSU Charter. The discussion was candid, demanding and at the same time, kindly. The communists noted their comrade's industry, pointed out certain deficiencies in his work and gave him numerous useful suggestions. Subsequently, the secretary of the

party organization and other comrades more than once went to Il'yenko and enquired as to how he was using the recommendations from the communists in his practical work.

This produced results. The collective began to notice that their colleague's professional training was improving, that he was fitting more and more confidently into the work routine.

The communists also began to notice something else. The fact that indications of meanness began to show up in Il'yenko. He might now and then refer to a colleague with contempt. He might be rude or untactful with those who pointed out a certain error he had made in his service. In the beginning Ivan Fedorovich did speak at party meetings. He even spoke of shortcomings, the people say. His criticism was strange, though. It was as though he made the criticisms as an outside observer. "I have not been in your collective long and I consider it my duty to point out..." he would emphasize. "In your collective," he would say, although he bore responsibility for everything occurring in the collective, the same as everyone else.

"We then began to be surprised by how Il'yenko reacted when his comrades were praised for their successes in the service," officer G. Malyshko, a CPSU member, said when I spoke with him. "Ivan Fedorovich was simply envious of colleagues whose work was properly appreciated by command. He felt that they did not deserve it. And he was simply being left out, when it came to praise. He should have thought about the matter soberly, should have understood that he only had to work the way he should, be even more determined and persistent with the improvement of his professional skill and be more active in the public life of the collective, and he would also receive the recognition and respect of his colleagues. For some reason he did not try to understand this, however. He would find a convenient excuse to avoid troublesome jobs. Take the matter of outfitting the assembly point, for example. This involves a great deal of work, to be sure. After he had started it, however, the others would have helped. And he has still not raised a finger. He is waiting for everything to be done for him. Upon receiving an assignment, some people seek ways and means of accomplishing it, while others will look for 'objective' reasons for not doing it. That is what we have here...."

"We told Ivan Fedorovich," officer I. Shvets, secretary of the military commissariat's party bureau, said, "that he should rid himself of conceit, be more tactful and more regarding both of others and of himself. We called upon him to be more self-critical. Otherwise, we had an individual who could spot the slightest deficiency in another, while failing to see the most glaring errors in himself. Ivan Fedorovich complains that he has been harassed for his criticism, but I cannot recall an instance in which he received real, constructive criticism. Over the past 2 years he has hardly spoken at party meetings in general. One sometimes hears his voice, though--caustic retorts and sometimes, truly insulting comments. We tell him that if he does not agree with someone's opinion, he should speak out and defend his point of view. Finally, we tell him to observe meeting discipline, to listen to others. But no, our words do not get through to him."

He also refuses to take part in public affairs. Recently, for example, he was assigned the task of preparing and conducting a talk with military commissariat employees. I tried to help him, if he needed it. He did not carry out the party's assignment. He claimed that the senior chief had permitted only the section chiefs to speak to the personnel, and he was a senior assistant, after all. No one issued such instructions, however, no one could. It is clear, is it not, that every communist has a duty to talk to the people...!"

The more the officers and employees told me about the life of their collective and the more deeply I enquired into the situation existing in the military commissariat, the more apparent one thing became: The apparent logic of Ivan Fedorovich's reasoning, the convincingness of the proof presented in his letters to the editor were misleading.

Yes, there are deficiencies in the performance of the military commissariat. Its workers do not always achieve success. A commission which checked on the military commissariat last year revealed these deficiencies--in the organization of both the socialist competition and the ideological-indoctrinational work. The report on the inspection noted that certain officers have been penalized for negligence in their service and for poor discipline.

The communists with the military commissariat are well aware of all these deficiencies. They are fully discussed at party meetings and sessions of the party bureau. A frank discussion has taken place at a party meeting with the agenda "The Communist--a Model of Principle, Activeness and Performance efficiency," among others. The secretary of the party bureau set the tone for the discussion. In his report he provided an objective evaluation of the performance of party members who had deviated from the requirements contained in the regulations. Other communists spoke out in the party manner. A serious, specific decision was adopted at the meeting, and steps were worked out for eliminating the deficiencies. These measures are already producing results. Criticism in the party organization has become more objective. Greater demands are being made of the comrades with errors in their work. The party bureau regularly hears reports from the CPSU members on their fulfillment of the requirements contained in the CPSU Charter. Party influence upon the state of affairs in the collective has increased markedly.

Then just why does Ivan Fedorovich maintain that the opposite is true? Most of the communists feel that the answer to this question can be derived to some degree from events occurring in the military commissariat recently. The officer who was Captain Il'yenko's immediate superior was discharged into the reserve. A replacement was needed. And although the administration at the military commissariat had their own ideas about candidates for advancement to this position, Ivan Fedorovich considered himself candidate number one. That's the way it had to be, he figured. There was a basis for advancing him. His record of service itself counted for something. He had spent enough time in the military commissariat. What if he did have shortcomings? Who does not have them? People complained about his rudeness and lack of tact. They were simply trying to "get at him." Il'yenko's intense pride and his desire to get ahead in the service no matter what prevented him from viewing things realistically, from taking a critical look at himself from the side, so to speak. And when serious complaints were leveled against him for derelictions in his service performance (the military commissar was even forced to temporarily relieve him of his duties) and it became clear that he would have to give up for the time being his thoughts of promotion, Ivan Fedorovich decided to pay back those who had "offended him," to bring everything out into the open, as he saw it. And so the letter was written to the editors, in which the author appeared as a champion of justice and party principle.

This case makes one think about the following. Let us open up the CPSU Charter. In the second paragraph, which discusses the duties of a party member, the word "struggle" is mentioned several times. The Charter demands that a communist boldly reveal shortcomings and strive to correct them, and struggle against ostentation, conceit and complacency,

develop criticism and self-criticism. This was also stressed in the CPSU Central Committee's Accountability Report to the 26th party congress: "Do everything possible to establish a spirit of self-criticism and intolerance of deficiencies in every collective. Criticism is the inseparable right of the party member. And he must use this right every time the cause demands it. When you see shortcomings, don't pass over them. Try to correct them. Struggle! It is not fitting for a party member or candidate member to hush up deficiencies. Is it becoming to a communist, however, to use criticism and the authority of criticism based on any other, personal considerations? Is this not why Captain Il'yenko's "principled" position cannot be accepted by his comrades?

The following was typical of Il'yenko. The communists with the military commissariat suggested to him: Let's get together, discuss the situation, consider your complaints and your shortcomings, and you do have some, and get to the bottom of them. Ivan Fedimovich flatly rejected the suggestion. Why? After all, if an individual is motivated by real concern for the common cause, if he feels that he is right, then why should he avoid a group discussion based on principle?

I recall one other incident similar to the one above. The editors received a letter from communist A. Karpenko. He reported that there were shortcomings in the work of the rayon KPO (billeting unit). Judging from the author's statements and from documents which he sent to the editors, financial violations and deviations from the requirements contained in the regulations were being committed in the unit, indoctrinational work was poorly conducted and standards of party life were violated.

An inspection confirmed some of the facts. And so, it only remained to thank the author for not ignoring the shortcomings and for revealing the negligence. It was learned, however, that Karpenko had reported about all these incidents only after he was, against his wishes... discharged into the reserve. One naturally asks himself why this communist did not speak up earlier. Why did he not speak out boldly and resolutely against the disorders? He knew about the deficiencies but kept his silence. It was not until his personal interests were involved that he decided to show he was a fighter. Is this a position based on principle, however? No, here we have the well-known line of reasoning that when you leave, you should slam the door as loudly as possible.

The communist's position. The individual demonstrates it in different ways. Primarily, there is no question, with his deeds. He also does so with his words of criticism. Do these words always reflect the communist's active vital stance, however? Criticism dictated by a sincere desire to rectify shortcomings helps the cause, of course. People sometimes use the authority of criticism for their own personal interests, however, attempt to show themselves in a good light or to get even with someone by donning the toga of a fighter. And this usually occurs in those party organizations where there is inadequate concern for developing party qualities in the communists, where each individual's contribution to the overall job is not always assessed from a standpoint of principle, where demandingness is not applied and where the individual is not helped to take a self-critical look at himself.

It sometimes happens, of course, that a communist in all sincerity makes a mistake. The most important thing for him in such a case is a benevolent, comradely discussion and friendly advice backed up with concrete assistance. It is one of the standards of our party life to convince a comrade of the error of his views, to caution him against

incorrect actions, while demonstrating a sincere interest in his affairs. It is also sometimes useful to hold an individual strictly accountable for deviations from the requirements contained in the CPSU Charter. It is not good, however, when we close our eyes to shortcomings in a communist's behavior or his character or when we are condescending and tolerant, when we should demonstrate party principle.

Let us return to the situation in the military commissariat. A report on CPSU member Il'yenko was being approved at one of the party meetings. It contained some unflattering statements, particularly with respect to the fact that Il'yenko's behavior indicated excessive confidence and unjustifiable attempts to advance in the service. The communist was evaluated strictly but fairly. The evaluation might have prompted Il'yenko to be more demanding of himself, to think over a number of things.

It was suggested at the meeting, however, that the report be "toned down." And the communists did just that. I doubt that this sort of compromise decision produced the proper effect or the desired result, however, or helped to develop principle and responsibility in the communist.

Unquestionably, there must be honest and open interrelations among the communists in a party organization. And nothing helps to create a wholesome climate in the party collective like criticism and self-criticism. The CPSU Charter requires that a communist be intolerant of shortcomings. The November 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee stressed the fact that we should resolutely combat all violations of party discipline. And this means rising above any sort of personal considerations in all cases, being guided by party principle in all things.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

COMMENTARY ON WESTERN ACCOUNTS OF WWII

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[Article by Col (Retired) V. Sekistov, doctor of historical sciences, professor: "The Battle on the Volga: the Historical Truth Against the Anti-Soviet Falsifiers"]

[Text] The Soviet people, all progressive people on earth, are commemorating the 40th anniversary of the remarkable victory on the Volga. After exhausting the enemy in fierce defensive battles, Soviet forces switched to an offensive on 19 November 1942, which ended with the encirclement of the Wehrmacht's assault grouping (the 6th Field Army and the 4th Tank Army) in the area of Stalingrad. By the end of 2 February 1943 the remains of the German fascist forces which had been encircled and utterly defeated were forced to capitulate.

Staggered by the routing of their best forces, the fascist clique announced a 3-day period of mourning in the Reich. A wave of admiration for the Red Army's feat rolled over all the nations of the anti-Hitlerite coalition, however. The French and the Belgians rejoiced at the news that the 6th Army had been routed and that F. Paulus had been taken prisoner. They remembered very well how in 1940 that army had invaded Belgium and then entered Paris. "With such an army," Hitler boasted, "we could storm the skies." And now this select army, drunk with its successes in Belgium, France, Greece and Yugoslavia, had met its inglorious end at the walls of Stalingrad.

Stalingrad.... This word was passed from mouth to mouth as the watchword of victory, as the symbol of inevitable and ultimate defeat for the fascist bloc. The great victory on the Volga gave powerful impetus to the Resistance Movement in the European nations occupied by the Hitlerites and initiated a basic turning point in the entire course of World War II. The strategic initiative had been wrested from the aggressor's hands. The mass expulsion of the invaders from our homeland's territory began.

The victory achieved by the Soviet forces at Stalingrad made an enormous impression in political and military circles of the anti-Hitlerite coalition. American President T. Roosevelt sent the heroic city on the Volga a letter in which he noted the worldwide historical importance of its feat and expressed admiration for Stalingrad's valorous defenders. "Their glorious victory," wrote Roosevelt, "halted the wave of invasion and was the turning point in the war of the Allied Nations against the forces of aggression." British Prime Minister W. Churchill called the victory "amazing."

The acknowledgement by General D. Eisenhower, Commander in Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces assigned to land in North Africa, was remarkable. At the height of the fighting at Stalingrad he wrote to U.S. Army Chief of Staff G. Marshall in a secret report, which has now been published: "The determined resistance of the Russians has provided us with the freedom to select the place, the time and the quantity of forces for the decisive offensive." And this was so. At the beginning of November 1942 American and British troops landed unhindered in Algeria and Morocco. Hitler and Mussolini had no time for Africa.

The Battle of Stalingrad was followed by new and decisive battles by the Red Army: near Kursk and in the Right-Bank Ukraine. On 16 April 1944 T. Roosevelt sent W. Churchill a secret message, which, among other things, stated that the USA and Britain "must give due credit to the great successes of the Soviet armies." It was precisely these successes which prompted our western allies finally to open a real second front and made it easier for them to conduct operation "Overlord," the landing of troops on the coast of France.

It can be said without exaggeration that the echo of the Stalingrad Battle resounded through all subsequent events in the war, inspiring millions of fighters against fascism to perform additional feats. They willed upcoming generations to preserve for ever the memory of this historic battle, of the steadfastness and courage of the Soviet soldier, who saved the world from the brown plague.

Strategic ideologists had a different objective, however--to totally erase from the human memory the grandeur of the feat performed on the Volga and, by falsifying history, to send out once again into its propaganda orbit the false rumor of "red militarism" and the "Soviet military threat." We would remind the reader that, under the cover of this myth, which was concocted by the enemies of socialism immediately following the Great October victory, the Entente carried out military campaigns against Soviet Russia in 1918-1920 and preparations were made in the 1930s for a second invasion against the USSR by international imperialism.

Fascist Germany's attack on our homeland did not lay this myth to rest at all. The founders of the myth were forced to become silent for a time. They felt that they could not muffle the voices of those progressive figures in the nations of the anti-Hitlerite coalition who were telling the truth about the Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War against the fascist invaders, including the truth about the Battle of Stalingrad.

This is how it was during the war. After the defeat of fascist Germany and militaristic Japan, however, in the achievement of which the USSR had the crucial role, the myth of the "Soviet military threat" was once more brought up with fanfare by the ministers of "cold war." The threat of fascist domination of the world had passed. U.S. imperialists, however, who were themselves pretenders to the role of masters of the destinies of peoples, set about preparing a war against the Soviet Union, which they, like the Hitlerites, regarded as the main barrier on the road to world domination. The decrepit anti-Soviet myth was once again used as a screen for their aggressive aspirations. The revealing fact is that while the strategists from the Pentagon were making an all-out effort to develop their plans for a nuclear attack against the USSR, the "Dropshot" plan among others, bourgeois historians were hard at work falsifying events of the last war and the Soviet fightingman's historic feat.

every possible belittlement of the Battle of Stalingrad was the main steed ridden by western historiography. It reached a point at which this battle was assigned a place of secondary importance behind the operation at Al-Alamein in October-November 1942 (in a multi-volume history of World War II published in the USA and England in the 1960s, for example). The objective of these pseudo-historical investigations was to bring public opinion over to the idea that it was not the Red Army's victory on the Volga but the success of British forces in North Africa which, they would have us believe, was the turning point in World War II.

We need only to compare two figures, and the total groundlessness of such "conclusions" becomes apparent. Rommel's army, which faced the British at Al-Alamein, had a total of around 50,000 soldiers and officers, whereas the German fascist forces on the Stalingrad axis alone numbered more than a million. Just where then, one asks, was the main axis in the battle against the fascist invaders?

The version about the "accidental nature" of the Battle of Stalingrad belongs to this period. Bourgeois historians began to link it directly to American shipments under lend-lease. If the USA had not provided the USSR with material assistance, they say, the battle on the Volga would have been won by the fascists. Bourgeois "theoreticians" deliberately resorted to obvious falsification of the facts, since they had to be aware of the concluding figures for lend-lease, which were published in the USA and the USSR after the war: The bulk of American shipments were made during the period between the second half of 1943 and the spring of 1945.

Other versions also came into being: the "fatal errors" of dilettante Hitler, who did not consider the generals' opinion; "a shortage of tank fuel," "the numerical superiority" of the Russians, and so forth. The objective of these versions was the same--to play down the historical significance of the victory at Stalingrad and the meritorious performance of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Studies produced by Soviet authors, in the preparation of which extensive use was made of historical documents, proved the complete groundlessness of the bourgeois scholars' interpretations of the reasons for the devastating defeat of the Wehrmacht's select troops at Stalingrad. Our scientists' conclusions were the following: There were no basic differences between Hitler and the generals on matters of the strategical offensive in the summer of 1942; the version of Hitler's sole, personal responsibility was necessary for rehabilitating the Hitlerite generals in the Wehrmacht in the interest of the Bundeswehr, which now has a leading place in the NATO ground forces; there was no acute shortage of fuel in a single operation conducted by the Wehrmacht, at least not during the period 1942-1943; the numerical strength of the ground forces and the strength of the air forces were almost equal for the two sides at the beginning of the Soviet counteroffensive.

The results of these studies are not at odds with the conclusions drawn by certain western authors who strive for objectivity. As an example, K. Erdman, a historian from the FRG, acknowledged that the legend of the military catastrophe occurring through the fault of Hitler alone "does not have any foundation whatsoever."

Books by W. Eisenhower, M. Howard, C. MacDonald and B. Liddell Hart were published here in the Russian language in the 1970s. It would be difficult for the uninitiated Western reader to figure out what is what in the works of these authors, because the

stress in them is deliberately confused. Let us turn to the book "History of the Second World War" by well-known British military historian and theoretician Liddell Hart, for example. In this composition the Battle of Stalingrad is tucked away in a small chapter with the vague title "The Turning Point in the Events in Russia." Operations of the British-American forces, however, are breathlessly described in chapters with flashy titles.

Liddell Hart writes that in the counteroffensive at Stalingrad and at Kursk the Russians "repeated and perfected the method used by Foch" in 1918. However, there is not a word about the fact that the French marshal only forced the Germans to give up their positions with attacks from various directions, whereas at Stalingrad Soviet forces not only encircled a 330,000-man grouping, but actually eliminated it.

We would point out incidentally that the method of employing the simultaneous offensive on a broad front with strikes from several directions was employed for the first time by Russian General A. Brusilov in 1916 on the southwestern front. This was the method borrowed by F. Foch. With respect to Soviet military art, back in the 1930s it acquired the original theory of the offensive operation in depth, which received practical application and was perfected during the Great Patriotic War.

Liddell Hart then attempts to equate the defense at Stalingrad with the battles fought at Verdun in 1916, in order to instill the idea that the results were fruitless. There is a fundamental difference between these engagements, however. A total of 69 French and 30 German divisions passed through the "Verdun meat grinder," losing up to a million men in all. The results? They were insignificant: The Germans advanced up to 10 kilometers on a limited sector during the six and a half months of fighting.

The steadfast defense of Soviet forces in the Battle of Stalingrad prepared the situation for switching to a decisive counteroffensive, the results of which shook the world. British historian B. Pitt acknowledges: "At Stalingrad during the crucial winter of 1942-1943 the Red Army's military chiefs demonstrated a correct understanding of the military situation. This should serve as an example for one and all.... The reinforcement of those defending in the city itself involved minimal necessity instead of maximum possibility, but the force and power thus built up there were used for executing the encirclement maneuver, which tightened the noose around the neck of the German 6th Army." Pitt notes that while Verdun left both sides drained and weakened, Stalingrad was the symbol of the Russian victory gained at reasonable cost.

In the West in the mid-1970s, as a result of the thawing of the international climate, the voices of those who were attempting in some way to come close to the truth and not to depart from it in their study of the events of the last war became louder. Characteristic of this is the assessment expressed by American historian H. Herring: "Friend's feelings toward the Russians, which had grown steadily during the alarming days of 1942, became sincere warmth and fervent eulogy following the victory at Stalingrad."

Some works by American and British bourgeois historians began to depict the Battle of Stalingrad and other important battles on the Soviet-German front as "turning points" in the war, which is what they actually were. American military historian M. Burg, for example, wrote that the defeat of the Hitlerite grouping at Stalingrad was one of the "glorious victories known to the world.... Stalingrad was a most brilliant example of perseverance for all of us. It instilled in our hearts ultimate confidence that victory would be gained."

The fact should be stressed that during the period of detente the most sober-minded politicians and historians in the USA (the bourgeois press called them "doves") derived the proper conclusions from the lessons of the past war. Let us cite, as an example, the assessment by such a well-known writer-"Sovietologist" as W. Bundy, who headed the editorial staff of the influential magazine FOREIGN AFFAIRS in the 1970s. "There is no doubt," he commented, "that the Soviet contribution to the achievement of victory was an essential one. This was unequivocally acknowledged throughout the United States and, of course, in army circles.... Detente is a gradual process, and I believe that today we have a better understanding on a number of problems than we did several years ago."

Some new factual information and studies by a number of historians were published in the USA during this period, which destroyed the false version of the "accidental nature" of the Soviet victory at Stalingrad. Well-known American writer A. Kahn reminded his fellow countrymen that lend-lease shipments in large quantities "began to arrive in the USSR only after a breakthrough in the war had been achieved at Stalingrad, that the Red Army owed its overwhelming superiority in military equipment to Soviet plants."

American journalist P. Bonosky, who witnessed the war himself and was well informed of the battles fought on the Soviet-German front, stated: "No, it was neither the snow nor the swamps nor the poor roads which won the victory. Hitler was destroyed by a new polity, by a new type of people with new ideals."

The process of detente in Soviet-American relations could not help affecting the frame of mind of even certain influential anti-Soviets. The transformation occurring in the views of well-known political figure and historian G. Kennan, as an example, was indicative of this. "In 1947," he wrote in the mid-1970s, "I was the author of the 'doctrine of containment'.... I absolutely refuse to consider myself the instigator of any attempts to apply this doctrine today in situations in which it does not and cannot have any appropriate application."

Naturally, these examples do not at all mean that the West has rejected the falsification of our history, the slandering of our people, the socialist system and the Armed Forces. What is more, many influential figures in the USA continue to sow doubts and skepticism and distrust in the policy of detente. The names of the leaders in the anti-Soviet flock of hawks are well known. They include Senators (U. Balki), B. Goldwater, D. Allen, S. Thurmond, E. Hollings and others. "Indefatigable guard protecting the Capital against detente" and ardent anti-Soviet Senator H. Jackson desperately attempts not only to maintain the active front of the "cold war" but even to intensify the ideological struggle against socialism to the greatest intensity.

The more aggressive-minded militaristic circles in the USA and NATO had managed to create some obstacles on the paths of detente by the end of the 1970s. These circles are most actively intensifying international tensions and forcing material preparations for war. In the area of ideological warfare imperialism switched to every sort of attack against socialism and launched a "psychological war" against the USSR. The myth of the "Soviet military threat" was now elevated to the rank of a component of policy of the USA and NATO. This drastic turn could not keep from influencing the new reassessment by bourgeois authors of the results of World War II, including the history of the Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War.

insisting on the need for a critical understanding of the last war's experience, Colonel Vernon, American military historian, wrote in the magazine MILITARY REVIEW: "History provides the basic material for reflection. The lessons of the past frequently prove useful for the future." And the premise itself is a true one. What lessons from the war are now being discussed in government circles and military headquarters of the USA and NATO, however, and for what purposes?

After all, the latest works by the most militant "Sovietologists" attempt to link the intensification of imperialism's aggressive course and the desire to bury detente with an alleged "growing military threat to the West." Periodicals published in the USA and England have recently become obsessively cluttered with a thesis to the effect that the sources of the present threat should be sought in the history of the last war. For example, the author of the article "The Soviets Meet the Americans in Berlin" published in the July 1982 issue of the magazine ARMY, attempts to convince the reader that the "Russians began the confrontation" back during the war. From this position imperialist ideologists began dusting off and reviving their falsifications. Chicago University President W. McNeil, for example, expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that "numerous myths" have been created around World War II, which, he says, were most frequently of a competitive, propagandistic nature and should therefore be "reconsidered." And our ideological enemies are using the 40th anniversary of the victory at Stalingrad as a flitting pretext for intensifying the anti-Soviet focus of their "historical investigations."

What is the focus of today's reconsideration of the anti-Soviet myths and the discrediting of the CPSU's peace-loving policy? Bourgeois authors are endeavoring to prove that military power has performed and continues to perform the role of "the main stimulus to Soviet expansionism." The book "Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument" by S. Kaplan, a leading member of the Brookings Institute, which was published in 1981, is typical in this respect. Kaplan imposes upon the reader the "conclusive" false conclusion that military power "has been actively utilized in the USSR as a political instrument of the USSR, that one should seek the origins of the expansion of foreign territory" begun in 1944 back in the victory at Stalingrad, that is, at the beginning of the Red Army's liberation mission.

This turn in bourgeois propaganda did not occur by chance. A sort of reassessment of history is now taking place in the USA. It is clearly apparent in other recent publications as well. The western reader is being deluged with a murky flood of all sorts of falsifications, the goal of which is to demonstrate that the "Soviet military threat" follows a historical pattern. In 1979, for example, a group of American authors published the book "Communism in Eastern Europe," in which they explain that "the Soviet victory in 1942-1943 brought the creation of a staging area for subsequent expansion in Europe." In 1982 the American authors of the book "Soviet Art of War: Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics" plainly stated that the origins of the current "Soviet military threat" are rooted in the year 1943, when the fanfare was made over the Soviet victory at Stalingrad. The slogan "The Most Dangerous Thing is to Underestimate the Russians" is being repeated in the West.

The authors of the above-named bourgeois publications assert that the experience of the last war is not always correctly described in previous works by American and British scholars. They feel that too much was written in the past about the

1970s and 1980s, which make the impression of the USSR as a "weak enemy" on the minds of the readers. The increased "Soviet military threat," the "Aerospace Almanac, 1982" mentions, is forcing the USA "to reconsider its old assessments." Voices are being heard from the media, which state, among other things, that there needs to be a new approach to the assessments of the Soviet military experience, including the experience of the Stalingrad battles, that they should be viewed through the prism of the "heroism" of the Nazi generals."

All these are not simply appeals. Soviet military strength in the past war is being carefully reassessed in the USA. The above-mentioned D. Vernon stresses the fact that we should not "unthinkingly repeat" the old versions of military and economic weakness of the USSR in the USSR, that during the war years Hitler himself wrote about the German "underestimation of the "Russian colossus." Vernon believes that it would be more correct to speak of a "constant attempt by the Soviets, beginning in the 1920s, to achieve superiority over the West," thereby summing up his reasoning for demonstrating the "Soviet's current endeavor to achieve and consolidate strategic superiority."

But these are where the Masters Vernon are leading, falsifying history in the interest of aggression and war! Are the scholarly men overseas actually not aware of the USSR's official position, which has been repeatedly expressed in statements by its leaders? They are aware, and well aware. And all the more they attempt to discredit the USSR and the history of our peace-loving state.

In the book "Stalin's Policy Toward America: From Hostility to Cooperation and Then to Alliance" published in 1982, a certain (U. Tobmen) writes that thanks to skilful diplomacy the Soviet Union drew the USA over to its side, which gave it "hope for victory." The author clearly does not want to tell how the leaders of the USA and other capitalist countries entered into military and political collaboration with the USSR not from good intentions but due to objective historical circumstances, in which a real threat to the interests and the interests of the USA and England was emerging in the form of the Soviet aggressor, which made no secret of its plans for gaining world supremacy.

In the field of military art, a number of works by bourgeois "Sovietologists" stress, among other things, "achievements" which it would be "dangerous for the West" to ignore. However, out of the large number of important strategic operations conducted by the Soviet forces, beginning with the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, the magazine "Soviet Military Review" (1980) calls for a "more detailed investigation into the mysteries of the Soviet military art."

The "Sovietologists" have now found it necessary to stress the strong Soviet military art. Perhaps they want to objectively describe the history of the Soviet military art? Of course not! They are attempting, now from "scientific" objectivity, to frighten the western individual with the myth of the "Soviet military art." To reinforce this myth with references to history.

The Soviet fightingman's character has been initiated for these same purposes in bourgeois publications and military periodicals of the USA and the NATO countries. To understand his character, D. Vernon admits. We cannot, the American "Sovietologist" says, assess the Soviet soldier with the yardstick of World War II. We cannot, like Hitlerite, as well as American, generals called those soldiers "semi-savages." The same D. Vernon, for example, writes that the Soviet soldier is

steadfast, enduring and disciplined, does not fear cold nor hunger and is indoctrinated in communist ideals. In the West they advocate heeding the assessment by Hitlerite generals beaten at Stalingrad, whose own experience convinced them that the "Russians offer determined resistance" and "fight to the last man."

The main question now troubling the "Sovietologists" is the following: How can we explain even more convincingly the USSR's victory at Stalingrad and in the war as a whole through the prism of anti-Sovietism? The version involving the "accidental nature of the victory" is once again being placed into circulation in the propaganda. The interpretation is no longer the same, however. Today the bourgeois authors maintain the following.

Yes, the USSR won, but this was only possible because it was not isolated, because it received assistance from the USA, economically the strongest power in the West. Now, however, that same great power is heading the entire global front confronting socialism.

The USSR won at Stalingrad and in the war as a whole, but it defeated an enemy with "internal dissensions," and Hitler proved to be a "poor military leader." Today, however, the "free world" constitutes a "monolithic entity."

The USSR won the war because Germany and its allies were unable to surpass their enemy in the quantity and quality of weaponry and military equipment. Today, however, the USA and NATO have the potential for assuring themselves military-technological superiority.

Let us take a look at the true facts.

This is what American historian H. Herring writes about the U.S. economic assistance during the most difficult period of the war for us: "Military supplies under lend-lease played only an insignificant role in Soviet operations during the Stalingrad period." There is no need to discuss subsequent operations, because the Soviet economy, gaining speed, won the economic competition with fascist Germany through its own efforts, without U.S. assistance. The assertion to the effect that the USA ostensibly managed to "isolate" the Soviet Union after the war is also absolutely groundless. Passing off wishful thinking for reality, imperialism's apologists simply ignore the fact that a world socialist system was formed. With respect to capitalism's system, it certainly does not constitute a united "monolithic entity." There were imperialist conflicts, and there still are, including conflicts between the USA and its allies in the military blocs.

Bourgeois ideologists and politicians assert that although Germany was unable to achieve military-technological superiority, the USA will be able to do so. Today, however, as Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense, has stated, there is approximate equality between the sides in all cases, and with respect to the future, the Reagan Administration "should not hypnotize itself with the possibility of achieving military superiority over the USSR. Nothing will come of this."

And so, contemporary bourgeois historiography of the Great Patriotic War, including the Battle of Stalingrad, has taken on qualitatively new features. Bourgeois historians write about the "fortitude of the Soviet soldiers" at Stalingrad, but they use these assessments not to demonstrate the mass heroism displayed by the Soviet society in the defense of the socialist homeland, but to artificially heighten fear of the

alleged, inexorably growing "Soviet military threat." In the West they are also writing a great deal about the Soviet Union's economic capabilities emerging during the war, but the "statistics" used for this purpose are designed once again to frighten the individual and justify the arms race in the USA and other NATO nations.

Bourgeois ideologists today are not averse to discussing Stalingrad as the "Cannes of the 20th century." They certainly do not do so in order to demonstrate that the victory on the Volga was to the benefit of all freedom-loving peoples, however, but to frighten the residents of Western Europe, for example, with fictitious statements to the effect that the Soviet Army is readying itself to "swallow up" this area of the "free world" in one gulp.

Resorting to the use of certain facts and events from the Great Patriotic War for purposes of ideological diversion, the "Sovietologists" today are unable to ignore the CPSU's guiding role in the organization of the socialist homeland's protection and in the strengthening of the USSR's defenses. Large monographs--"Soviet Military Strategy" and "Soviet Military Thinking"--which discuss this matter, were published last year alone in the USA and England, one after another. Articles published on this subject in military periodicals of the USA and NATO number in the hundreds.

The facts on the CPSU's work, however, are interpreted so as to bring out the false picture of the Soviet Armed Forces allegedly being used both during the war and since the war "exclusively as an instrument of expansion." And this, you see, does not coincide with the "interests of Russia's peoples." What "touching" concern! The reckoning is simple: Maybe the western reader, misinformed by bourgeois propaganda with respect to the peace-loving policy of the CPSU and the party's guiding role in the Soviet State, will believe the thoroughly false fabrications of the "Sovietologists" about some sort of "conflicts" between the interests of the CPSU and those of the USSR's peoples.

The "psychological war" launched against socialism by the West is increasingly utilizing ideological diversions under the guise of "more objective" clarification of the history of World War II and its largest battles. And the great battle on the Volga was unquestionably one of these. The lessons from the last war, as reconsidered by the "sovietologists," are expected to serve the policy of aggression and war. This is why a determined and immediate rebuff must be given to all of imperialism's ideological diversions in the area of military history.

During the very first days of the Great Patriotic War the Communist Party and the Soviet Government openly proclaimed its political objectives: to drive the occupiers from Soviet land and to help the peoples of Europe become free of fascist enslavement. These were noble and progressive goals. They have nothing to do with a policy of expansion or the seizure of other people's land, a policy which some people are not averse to attributing to us. The substance of Soviet foreign policy, beginning with Lenin's Decree on Peace, is not to gain world domination, but to defend socialism. The military strength of the Soviet State, which has grown steadily since the war, and during the war as well, serves the accomplishment of this task.

The victory for Soviet weapons in the Battle of Stalingrad was the most important stage on the path to the total defeat of Hitlerite Germany. During the period between November 1942 and December 1943 the Red Army liberated almost half of the nation's temporarily occupied territory. Soviet forces overcame stiff enemy resistance to advance from

500 to 1,300 kilometers to the west. Almost the entire State Border of the USSR had been restored in 1944. Soviet soldiers completely fulfilled their patriotic and international duty as soldiers and liberators. They won the gratitude and affection of peoples who had experienced the fascist "new order."

The securing of peace remains the highest objective of the Soviet State's foreign policy today. The Program of Peace for the 1980s, adopted at the 26th CPSU Congress, and subsequent peace initiatives by the CPSU and the Soviet Government have met with enthusiastic response and most extensive support throughout the world.

The matter of reliably protecting socialism, however, is an urgent one today as never before. Imperialism's aggressive intrigues, Comrade Yu.V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has stated, are forcing us, together with the fraternal socialist states, to concern ourselves, and to concern ourselves seriously, with maintaining our defense capability at the proper level.

The lessons of the last war tell us to exercise the greatest of vigilance. Vigilance to its highest limits and constant combat readiness remain the main requirements made of the Armed Forces of the USSR by the Communist Party and the people.

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